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Pamela D. Palmater* An Empty Shell of a Treaty
Promise: R. v. Marshall and the
Rights of Non-Status Indians
One of the difficult issues presented by R. v. Marshall is that of who is a Mi'kmaq
person, or more generally who is entitled to claim to be a beneficiary of the
Treaties of 1760-61. This paper examines a number of possible approaches to
this matter, including ones based on residence (on or off reserve), descent and
the terms of the Indian Act. It notes the deficiencies of existing tests and of
Canadian case law that has addressed Aboriginal identity in other contexts. It
concludes by noting that the negotiations which must follow in the wake of
Marshall present the opportunity for a new, good faith dialogue to establish the
rules for ascertaining First Nations membership.
L'une des questions d~licates d6coulant de la d6cision de la Cour supreme dans
le dossier de R. v. Marshall est de d6terminer qui est Mi'kmaq. Autrement dit,
d'une maniere plus g6ndrale, j qui accorde-t-on les droits decoulant des trait6s
de 1760-1761. L'auteur propose diverses fagons d'envisager le probl~me en
utilisantcomme critere le lieu de rdsidence de I'individu (vivant en rdserve ou hors
r6serve), la descendance et les dispositions de la Loi sur les Indiens. II relive les
carences des criteres actuels et de la jurisprudence canadienne ob il a 6te
question de definir ce que 'on entend par Autochtone dans d'autres contextes.
II termine en soulignant que les negociations qui doivent 6tre entamees dans le
sillage de la d6cision Marshall fournissent une nouvelle occasion d'amorcer un
dialogue de bonne foi dans le but d'6laborer les r~gles r6gissant I'appartenance
aux premieres nations.
* The views I have expressed in this article are my own, written for the purposes of adding to
the discussion about Aboriginal people and their rights. The views I have expressed are not
necessarily those of my employer, the Department of Justice Canada, nor do they necessarily
represent the views of the Department of Indian Affairs and Northern Development. This
article should never be cited as representative of either Departments' position. I dedicate this
article to my two children, Mitchell and Jeremy who inspire me to help find solutions for our
great grandchildren many generations to come.
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Introduction
On 17 September 1999, sometime before noon, the Supreme Court of
Canada handed down its decision in R. v. Marshall.' Many people waited
anxiously for the decision to be posted on the Supreme Court of Canada
website. Modern technology has made it possible for persons of all
backgrounds to access this landmark decision instantaneously through
the use of computers. The unfortunate part is that the decision, while
instantaneous, also provoked an instantaneous reaction that was anything
but positive for the "non-status" Aboriginal people living in the Atlantic
provinces. As fast as the decision could be printed, so too were the media
interpretations of the case printed for public distribution. Newspapers not
only headlined the political and departmental interpretations of the case,
but also the public views of what this case meant for non-aboriginal
people. The non-status Mi'kmaq treaty beneficiaries caught the worst of
1. R. v. Marshall, [1999] 3 S.C.R. 456 [hereinafter Marshall].
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the reaction to the case, as they were the objects of criticism by Aboriginal
and non-aboriginal people alike.
The Supreme Court in Marshall held that Mi'kmaq peoples have a
treaty right to sell the fish they catch pursuant to the Treaties of1760-612
There are four main issues that have featured in the press and popular
conversations since the decision was posted: (1) what a moderate liveli-
hood means with regard to limiting the sale of fish under the treaty, (2)
whether the Mi'kmaq fishers would have to abide by the same fishing
regulations as the non-aboriginal commercial fishers, (3) what the case
would mean for the Passamaquoddy of Maine and (4) who are entitled to
call themselves Mi'kmaq treaty beneficiaries? While the first three issues
are important and need to be dealt with both on an interim and long-term
basis, the focus of this article will be on the position of the non-status
Mi'kmaq peoples and their claims as treaty beneficiaries under the
decision in Marshall. I will attempt to outline some of the legal arguments
which support their inclusion as beneficiaries under the Treaties of1760-
61 based on a review of the case law and policy. I will also review the
statistical ramifications of basing beneficiary status on membership in an
individual band, which is (generally) currently based on the Indian Act
membership provisions as opposed to traditional citizenship in an Ab-
original nation. In addition, I will analyze recent cases that support the
right of non-status Indians to be recognized in law, in which courts have
spoken out about the discrimination non-status Indians experience and
articulated a test for entitlement under Aboriginal treaties.
The treaty beneficiaries issue has brought to the forefront the related
issue of who has the right to call himself or herself an Aboriginal person
or First Nation member. Any future decisions that are made in this regard
will have a direct impact on the survival or extinction of the First Peoples
of this land. This is not the kind of choice that the Crown, Canadian
society or even a few Aboriginal people have the right to make. Aborigi-
nal identity, culture, nationhood and citizenship and/or membership is
not truly a legal, political or social issue. Human beings all over the world
and from all different cultures join in unions, have children and associate
with others in their communities in many different ways. The right to look
at one's child and call him or her Scottish or Irish, Acadian, Cree or
2. There were several treaties signed by representatives of the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet and
Passmaquoddy Nations during the 1760s. Some of which are as follows: (1) St. John's and
Passamaquoddy Treaty, February 23, 1760, (2) Le Have Treaty, March 10, 1760, (3)
Richibucto Treaty, March 10, 1760, (4) Penobscot Treaty, May 23, 1760, (5) Mirimichi Treaty,
June 25, 1761. The Court in Marshall was speaking to a treaty signed in 1760 with a group of
Mi'kmaq living in present day Nova Scotia.
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Mi'kmaq is a human cultural right that comes with the birth of the child
and the internal workings of one's culture. Who one's child can culturally
identify with should not be based on outdated, discriminatory legislation
or even the most recent case law. Nor should the government or society
pigeonhole the Aboriginal identity issue as their political decision to
make, based on the present democratic and administrative system im-
posed upon the First Nations of this continent. Similarly, to call this issue
a social one ignores the fact that it is not an issue that society as a whole
has a right to determine for Aboriginal peoples. The issue of Aboriginal
identity, community membership/citizenship and heritage is a cultural
right that belongs solely to the Aboriginal members of each Aboriginal
nation.
On the other hand, this right carries with it a tremendous responsibility
to ensure that all members of the community are included, protected and
respected. It is only once this goal has been met that the Aboriginal
struggle for self-government and true independence will be achieved.
The principle of fairness will likely mean a joint effort by Aboriginal
nations and Canada to arrive at an acceptable resolution of issues related
to Aboriginal citizenship, land claim beneficiaries and treaty beneficia-
ries, with the particular Aboriginal culture as the operative guide. Who
Aboriginal people are and how they identify as Aboriginal peoples is their
right as human beings based on centuries of culture and tradition, which
must be allowed to evolve over time to incorporate the modern realities
of our social interactions and changing cultures. Whether Canadian
society does not like the fact that Mi'kmaq people can now sell their fish
under the Treaties of1760-61 is not a sufficient reason to now exclude as
many Aboriginal people as possible from even qualifying for the right to
call themselves Mi' kmaq. When the Supreme Court of Canada stated that
the positive trade interpretation of the treaty is the only one that would
uphold the honour of the Crown,3 it does not follow that the honour of the
Crown will remain upheld by doing indirectly what was not permitted to
be done directly. The Court has given the Crown a directive to honour the
right to sell fish under the Treaties of1760-61. If the Crown then chooses
to limit who is a treaty beneficiary in such a way that severely limits the
numbers of beneficiaries within an Aboriginal group or results in the
eventual disappearance of the beneficiaries altogether, then what effec-
tively happens is that the Crown has frustrated the true spirit and intention
of this sacred Treaty signed in good faith by our ancestors not so long ago.
3. Marshall, supra note t at para. 4.
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In this article, I do not presume to know what the actual legal, political
or social positions of the off-reserve Aboriginal peoples' organizations
are with regard to this issue. I also do not know what the final positions
will be for each level of government or other Canadians. My goal is to
stress the fact that now is the time to give serious thought to this cultural
issue before final decisions are made that may be detrimental to Aborigi-
nal peoples. An effective and fair decision cannot be made based on
criteria such as who the Crown least wants to be sued by, how much of
an administrative burden may result, or whether an inclusive interpreta-
tion may cost the Crown and society more to implement. All the parties
have a chance to deal with this issue and I suggest that this is exactly what
should happen over the next decade. While there are better ways to
resolve this issue than relying on the legal framework, a review of the law
supports an inclusive method of determining treaty beneficiaries. It is to
this end that I wish to contribute a brief legal analysis of the rights of non-
status Indians as treaty beneficiaries under the Marshall decision. A brief
review of the facts will set the stage.
In this case, Donald Marshall, referred to by the Court as a "Mi'kmaq
Indian," was charged under the Fisheries Act4 for selling eels without a
license, fishing out of season, using prohibited nets and fishing without
a licence. Marshall defended the charges on the basis that he had a right
under a particular treaty signed in 1760 not only to fish at any time of year,
but also to sell his catch. Mr. Justice Binnie of the Supreme Court agreed
with Marshall's position and found that both courts below made errors in
their judgments. With regard to the trial judge's decision, Justice Binnie
criticized the narrow interpretation used:
While the trial judge drew positive implications from the negative trade
clause.., such limited relief is inadequate where the British-drafted treaty
document does not accord with the British-drafted minutes of the negotiat-
ing sessions and more favourable terms are evident from the other
documents and evidence the trialjudge regarded as reliable.... His narrow
view of what constituted "the treaty" led to the equally narrow legal
conclusion that the Mi'kmaq trading entitlement, such as it was, termi-
nated in the 1780s.5
4. Fisheries Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. F-14.
5. Marshall, supra note I at para. 20 [emphasis added].
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Justice Binnie then went on to review the errors committed by the Court
of Appeal:
The Court of Appeal, with respect, compounded the errors of law. It not
only read the Mi'kmaq "right," such as it was, out of the trial judgment, it
also took the view, at p. 204, that the principles of interpretation of Indian
treaties developed in connection with land cessions are of "limited specific
assistance" to treaties of peace and friendship where "the significant
'commodity' exchanged was mutual promises of peace." While it is true
that there is no applicable land cession treaty in Nova Scotia, it is also true
that the Mi'kmaq were largely dispossessed of their lands in any event, and
(as elsewhere) assigned to reserves to accommodate the wave of European
settlement which the Treaty of 1760 was designed to facilitate. It seems
harsh to put aboriginal people in a worse legal position where land had
been taken without their formal cession than where they have agreed to
terms of cession. A deal is a deal. The same rules of interpretation should
apply.6
The Supreme Court of Canada, after reviewing all the evidence and
hearing all the arguments, held that the Mi' kmaq people of the Maritime
provinces and the other Aboriginal nations who were party to the Treaties
of 1760-61 have the right to sell their fish to the extent that they could
pursue a "moderate livelihood" through this practice.7 The scope of the
moderate livelihood right was not limited to communities or bands, but
applied to "individual Mi'kmaq families." In this case, the rights of
Marshall, an individual Mi'kmaq, were upheld. There was no holding in
this case that Marshall was fishing under the "authority" of a First Nation
or Aboriginal community, nor was there any holding that he was fishing
for anyone's benefit but his own or his family's. One might have thought
that thejudgment was particular enough to provide the basis for which the
Crown and the Mi'kmaq could begin negotiations on how to incorporate
Mi'kmaq rights into the present fisheries conservation scheme.
The reaction to the decision was so negative, in fact, that the West
Nova Fishermen's Coalition, an intervener in the original Marshall case,
brought a motion before the Supreme Court of Canada to ask for a
6. Ibid. at para. 21 [emphasis added].
7. Ibid. The "moderate livelihood" was described as basic necessities such as housing,
clothing, food and other basic amenities. The Court held that the Crown could.impose catch
limits that would produce a moderate livelihood for "individual Mi'kmaq families at present-
day standards."
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rehearing and a stay of thejudgment.8 The decision in this "new" case was
rendered exactly two months after the original Marshall case was handed
down. Never in the history of Aboriginal rights law in Canada has a non-
aboriginal group asked the Court to rehear a case. It stands as a testament
to the ongoing battle that Aboriginal people face even after they have won
a "victory" in the courts. Just when discussions are about to begin on how
to negotiate the inclusion of Mi'kmaq treaty rights into the fisheries
legislation, they are interrupted by a plea to essentially change the
outcome of the case. The Supreme Court denied the motion for a
rehearing and a stay, but went on to make several clarifications on the
original holding beyond that which was necessary to dispose of the
motion. Thus, we are left with the holding that the individual Mi'kmaq,
Marshall and individual Mi'kmaq families have this right to sell eels. This
is a far cry from the assertion that only status Indians living on a reserve
in present-day Nova Scotia are entitled to these treaty rights. Status
Indians are only one group of Aboriginal people in Canada who hold
various Aboriginal and/or treaty rights. Their numbers are roughly equal
to that of non-status Indians yet the latter group are marginalized by both
governments and society and do not receive benefits under the Indian Act.
The genesis of these different labels for Aboriginal people even within a
single nation is the Indian Act. It is also this same Act that threatens to
bring about the legislative extinction of Aboriginal people if both the
Crown and Aboriginal people do not act soon.
I. The Vanishing Peoples
1. Definitional Issues
Before I review the statistical data relating to the legislative identification
and membership of Aboriginal peoples, it is necessary to explain some of
the terminology. The term "status Indian" refers to a person who is
registered pursuant to the provisions of the Indian Act as an "Indian."
Indians registered under the Indian Act are most often referred to as
"status Indians." This registration is not premised on whether one is in
fact an Aboriginal person by ancestry, whether the person follows the
8. R. v. Marshall, [199913 S.C.R. 533 [hereinafter Marshall 2]. Note that in this second case,
there was obiter about what the first Marshall case was really saying about the Treaty of 1760.
It seems to differ slightly from the first case in that now the focus of the right is on the local
community(ies) who may have signed that particular treaty. It also added that this right was a
communal right that was to be exercised under communal authority-something that was not
stated in the first case. The second case spoke only of the Mi'kmaq and not the Maliseet and
Passamaquoddy as it did in the first case. The court did not specifically address the issue of
beneficiaries nor did it overturn any previous decision on beneficiaries. Thus on the beneficiary
issue the court was consistent in both Marshall and Marshall 2.
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traditional ways of his or her nation, whether he or she participates in
cultural activities or even whether he or she lives on a reserve. To be a
status Indian or "government Indian" one must simply meet the require-
ments of having the right combination of parents on the right dates under
the provisions of the Indian Act.9 In fact there are many people, mainly
women, who are registered as Indians and have no Aboriginal ancestry at
all, due to past requirements under the Indian Act. Yet, there are many
more Aboriginal people by ancestry who are not registered under the
Indian Act. These unregistered persons of Aboriginal ancestry are often
referred to as "non-status Indians." That term is not found in the Indian
Act, but is widely recognized as referring to this group who have mixed
ancestry but who will not or cannot be registered as Indians under the
current legislation. The off-reserve community, as it is commonly re-
ferred to, comprises both status and non-status Indians and M6tis' 0 who
do not live on reserves.
There are other labels given to Aboriginal people which are represen-
tative of the many cultural and political groups to which Aboriginal
people belong. The descendants of Aboriginal nations who signed
treaties with the Crown are often referred to as "treaty Indians." Aborigi-
nal people who are members of other nations outside Mi'kmaq and
Maliseet territory are referred to as "non-territorial Indians." There is also
a difference between a First Nation and a band as constituted under the
Indian Act. For example, the Mi'kmaq is one of the First Nations of the
continent, but in addition to the off-reserve Mi'kmaq people, there are
individual bands of Mi'kmaq in Nova Scotia and other Maritime prov-
inces. The Indian Act band itself is not the Nation, but merely a smaller
legislated group of a larger Nation whose "governing" or community
structure is currently regulated by the Indian Act. The Aboriginal Fisher-
ies Strategy (AFS) agreements with the Department of Fisheries and
Oceans (DFO) are negotiated with representatives of the on and off-
reserve communities that represent the status and non-status Indians. 1"
Many bands claim that they represent both the on- and off-reserve status
9. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5.
10. Mtis people are also Aboriginal people with mixed Aboriginal ancestry. This group will
not be the focus of this article as their status in law has yet to be determined, and they have a
unique history as compared with First Nations. There is currently some controversy over
whether M6tis will be recognized as a nation, part of those that descend from the Red River
group in Western Canada, or whether they are anyone of mixed ancestry. I will discuss briefly
some relevant cases later in this article that may help answer those questions.
11. Further discussion of these fisheries agreements will be found in Part III (2), "Commu-
nication Gaps Do Not Seem to Have Narrowed," below.
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Indian members. 12 On the other hand, other Aboriginal organizations
such as the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council, the Native
Council of Nova Scotia and the Native Council of Prince Edward Island
claim that they represent the off-reserve constituency here in the Maritimes,
both status and non-status alike. These three provincial organizations are
affiliates of their national organization, the Congress of Aboriginal
Peoples (CAP), a group which claims to represent off-reserve status and
non-status Aboriginal peoples all over Canada. It is this division between
the on- and off-reserve and status and non-status that makes negotiation
under the Marshall case more difficult than it would at first appear.
There are also legal definitions for some of these groups, some of
which are broad and as yet undefined and others which are specifically
defined under particular legislation. Section 35(1) of the Constitution
Act, 1982 confirms the rights of Aboriginal peoples in Canada:
(1) The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the aboriginal
peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.
Section 35(2) of the Constitution Act, 1982 defines Aboriginal peoples:
(2) In this Act, "aboriginal peoples of Canada" includes the
Indian, Inuit and Mtis peoples of Canada.
This clause does not further define what is meant by "Indian, Inuit and
Mtis." The present debate over "Aboriginality" brought on by the
Marshall case really misses the point. To argue that the only rightful
beneficiaries under a treaty are status Indians as defined under the Indian
Act not only defeats the purpose of even having the treaty, but makes our
constitutional provisions appear hollow and deceptive. Surely this was
neither the intent nor the purpose of section 35's inclusion in the
Constitution Act, 1982.13 In addition, the federal government has a
12. The historical inability for off-reserve band members to vote for their Chief and Council
under the Indian Act made this assertion highly questionable. Recent cases, which I will discuss
later in this article, may help alleviate current representation problems. Please see Part 11 (3),
"Disenfranchisement is Discriminatory," below.
13. See R. v. Van der Peet, [1996] 2 S.C.R. 507, where Chief Justice Lamer discusses the
purpose of section 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 at 538-39 and states: "In my view, the
doctrine of aboriginal rights exists, and is recognized and affirmed by s.35(l), because of one
simple fact: when Europeans arrived in North America, aboriginal peoples were already here,
living in communities on the land, and participating in distinctive cultures, as they had done
for centuries. It is this fact, and this fact above all others, which separates aboriginal peoples
from all other minority groups in Canadian society and which mandates their special legal, and
now constitutional status." Therefore, if the special constitutional status of Aboriginal and
treaty rights is to remain, there must be Aboriginal peoples to hold these rights.
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specific constitutional responsibility for Indians which mandates a higher
level of duty to ensure that federal legislation does not bring about the
legislative extinction of Aboriginal peoples.14
Section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867, gave the federal govern-
ment jurisdiction over "Indians and lands reserved for Indians," but did
not provide a definition of the term "'Indian." A reference case"s in 1939
to the Supreme Court of Canada determined that the Inuit (previously
known as Eskimo) were included in the term "Indian" under section
91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. Yet, the Indian Act does not apply
to the "race of aborigines commonly referred to as Inuit" as per section
4(1) of the Act. The Indian Act specifically defines the term "Indian" in
section 4(1) as follows:
"Indian" means a person who pursuant to this Act is registered as an Indian
or is entitled to be registered as an Indian.
There is no racial requirement that status Indians have an Aboriginal
blood tie or lineal link to an Aboriginal nation. There is academic support
for the proposition that non-status Indians are protected under s. 35 of the
Constitution Act, 1982 as Aboriginal people either specifically in the
category of Indian, M6tis or as a yet unlisted Aboriginal group.'6 Section
35 defines Aboriginal people as "including" certain named groups, but
did not limit the content of that group. Some of the non-status people
alternatively identify as Mdtis and assert those rights as well. Jack Wood-
ward explained the significance of the terminology used in section 35:
Prior to the passage of the Constitution Act, 1982, each of the three
aboriginal groups had received some form of legal recognition. The use of
the word "includes"-rather than, for example, "means"-infers that
there may be other peoples who could raise a reasonable claim that they
ought to be considered "aboriginal."' 7
14. R. v. Powley (2000), 47 O.R. (3d) 30 (Sup. Ct.) [hereinafter Powley, appeal]. The court
in this case rejected a solely blood quantum requirement for Mrtis peoples in paragraph 56:
"Blood quantum requirements for MNtis people should be rejected because they reveal little
about how an individual defines his or her own identity in relation to a M~tis community.
Requiring proof of a genealogical tie to the original Mtis inhabitants places.., too heavy a
burden on Mdtis applicants and too easily leads to the extinguishment of Mtis rights through
attenuated blood lines."
15. Re Eskimos, [1939] S.C.R. 104.
16. J. Woodward, Native Law (Toronto: Carswell, 1990) [hereinafter Woodward].
17. Ibid. at 3.
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Woodward explains that there are different legal meanings applied to the
word "Indian." He observes that a person may be an Indian in one context,
but not in another. Indians have been defined according to their member-
ship in a group, which is more of apolitical determination, whereas others
have been defined based on lineal descent by blood, from a native
ancestor)a
In some parts of the country, status Indians are referred to as treaty
Indians, and the term non-treaty has been used to signify non-status.
These characterizations lead to much confusion, since in the Maritimes
the Mi'kmaq and Maliseet are both signatories to many of the local
treaties and could therefore be considered treaty Indians, and thereby
recognized as "Indians," regardless of status under the Indian Act.
Similarly, when the federal Crown speaks of band members, or commu-
nity members, there is a negative connotation that it is referring solely to
status Indians, but that is not necessarily the case. Woodward explains
that the Crown has even recognized non-status Indians as "Indians" for
some purposes:
Prior to 1985, band membership carried with it Indian status. Since the
1985 amendments to the Indian Act, however, Indian status and band
membership are determined separately, and may or may not coincide.
Most status Indians have band membership. But a body of band members
now exist without Indian status .... By virtue of s.4.1 [of the Indian Act],
non-status band members are Indians for certain purposes.'9
Therefore, it cannot be said that the Crown has at no time recognized non-
status Indians as Indians, let alone as Aboriginal peoples or treaty Indians.
There are also government programs that provide money to assist non-
status Indians and off-reserve groups on the basis of their status as
Aboriginal people. In addition, land claim settlements make specific
reference to the beneficiaries, which include several generations of what
would otherwise be non-status Indians. 20 Section 3.2.2 of the Yukon
Agreement has the following as its eligibility criteria:
18. Ibid.at5-10.
19. Ibid. at 11 [emphasis added].
20. Umbrella Final Agreement Between The Government of Canada, the Councilfor Yukon
Indians and the Government of the Yukon (29 May 1993) (Ottawa: Minister of Indian Affairs
and Northern Development, 1993) [hereinafter Yukon Agreement].
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3.2.2. A Person is eligible for enrollment as a Yukon Indian Person under
one of the Yukon First Nation Final Agreements if that Person is a
Canadian citizen, and:
3.2.2.1 establishes that he is of25% ormore Indian ancestry and was
ordinarily Resident in the Yukon between January 1, 1800 and
January 1, 1940;
3.2.2.2 establishes that he is a Descendant of a Person living or
deceased eligible under 3.2.2. 1;
3.2.2.3 establishes that he is an Adopted Child of a Person living or
deceased eligible under 3.2.2.1 or 3.2.2.2; or
3.2.2.4 upon application within two years of the Effective Date of a
Yukon First Nation Final Agreement to the Enrollment Commission
by that Yukon First Nation, is determined by the Enrollment
Commission in its discretion, and upon consideration of all relevant
circumstances, to have a sufficient affiliation with that Yukon First
Nation so as to justify enrollment.2'
Based on the above eligibility criteria, one would have to be of 25%
Indian ancestry (blood), or a descendant of such a person.2 2 There appears
to be no limit on how many generations you can go back in order to qualify
for membership, so long as the applicant is a direct descendant of the
initial person who qualifies. These agreements cover interest in lands and
natural resources, presumably what would otherwise have been the
subject of Aboriginal rights claims. This agreement questions the validity
of limiting treaty beneficiaries to status Indians only. This conclusion is
further supported by the fact that the same justifications that may have
been used in the early 1900s to exclude non-status Indians are no longer
appropriate given section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 and the modem
values enunciated by the Supreme Court of Canada.
Larry Gilbert, who has testified in courts on various registration and
status issues, notes in his text on Aboriginal membership issues that the
mandate of the original provisions of the Indian Act was to reduce the
Aboriginal population so as to force assimilation. He also believes that
this practice has continued into the present:
21. Ibid. at 25-26 [emphasis added].
22. Ibid. at 25. Chapter 3 of this agreement is entitled Eligibility and Enrollment. Section
3.1.0 defines a descendant as a "direct descendant by either maternal or paternal line,
notwithstanding any intervening adoption and independent of whether any child of the line was
born within or outside a marriage."
114 The Dalhousie Law Journal
[T]he current Indian Act continues with that tradition. Subsection 6(2) of
the present Indian Act is a case in point which many observers consider to
be a draconian attempt by Parliament to limit the number of Indians in
Canada. It is often referred to as the second generation cut-off rule.
Subsection 6(2) is simply a new technique for an old habit of Ottawa's: it
was often called purging or correcting band lists. .... 21
This kind of policy justification, namely assimilation, cannot be consid-
ered a valid one to support a policy of limiting treaty beneficiaries.
Policies based on a desire to end a race or culture of people would not meet
the honour of the Crown nor would it meet international standards on
human rights. 24 The very purpose of section 35 of the Constitution Act,
1982 is to protect existing Aboriginal and treaty rights. Surely the right
to exist as an Aboriginal person would be absolutely essential in order to
exercise an Aboriginal right. How could the Crown on the one hand
legislate the protection of Aboriginal rights under the Constitution Act,
1982, yet also continue to support the legislative extinction of Aboriginal
people under the Indian Act, on the other hand? Canada cannot in good
faith take the "disappearing Indian" approach to determining beneficiary
status and still point to section 35 of the Constitution Act, 1982 as its
honourable commitment to protect Aboriginal and treaty rights, if in one
hundred years there will be no "accepted" or "government" Indians left.
It is long past the time that the effects of this kind of destructive
legislation be remedied and Aboriginal peoples be treated with dignity
and respect. This includes non-status peoples whether they live on or off-
reserve. This issue, while largely ignored, will no doubt come to the fore
when the Aboriginal nations living in the Maritimes actually sit down
with their own members/citizens and the Crown to work out self-
government arrangements. The subject of self-government raises issues
23. L. Gilbert, Entitlement to Indian Status and Membership Codes in Canada (Toronto:
Thomson Canada, 1996) at 12, n. 3 [emphasis added] [hereinafter Gilbert].
24. Canadian Charter of Human Rights and Freedoms, Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982,
being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (U.K.), 1982, c. 11. See also: International Covenant
on Civil and Political Rights (1966) 999 U.N.T.S. 171, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 47, in force,
including Canada, 1976; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
(1966) 993 U.N.T.S. 3, 1976 Can. T.S. No. 46, in force, including Canada, 1976 [hereinafter
ICESCR]. Part I, Article I, sections 1, 2 and 3 of the ICESCR provide in part as follows: "(1)
All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine
their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development."; "(2)
... In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence."; and "(3) The States
... shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination .. " Article 2, section 2
provides further that: "(2) The States... undertake to guarantee that the rights enunciated..
. will be exercised without discrimination of any kind as to race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status." Due to time
and space constraints, I will have to explore international issues for Aboriginal people in
another article.
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of taxation, jurisdiction, land, housing and related issues which are
dependant on the number of citizens and whether there will be any around
when it comes time to negotiate governmental powers. The Royal
Commission on Aboriginal Peoples concluded that the test for Aboriginal
membership should be based on principles of reasonableness and fairness
which take into account Aboriginal cultural, social and political associa-
tions. The Commission explained:
Aboriginal peoples are not racial groups; rather they are organic political
and cultural entities. Although contemporary Aboriginal groups stem
historically from the original peoples of North America, they often have
mixed genetic heritages and include individuals of varied ancestry. As
organic political entities, they have the capacity to evolve over time and
change their internal composition.25
They even go so far as to say that a pre-condition to qualifying for the right
of self-government is that membership in the nation must be arrived at
fairly:
Since an Aboriginal nation must be constituted in an inclusive manner to
qualify for the right of self-determination, a large-scale membership
dispute of this kind could be very significant.26
As with other cultures and societies in our world, so too should the
Aboriginal nations be allowed to change and grow over time. The
Supreme Court of Canada has already rejected the "frozen in time"
approach to Aboriginal rights." How then could the Crown or society
expect that with regard to Aboriginal people all must be as it was in the
year 1200, 1500 or even 1900? Canada has allowed many people from
other nations to live in Canada, participate in its politics and become
Canadian citizens. Aboriginal nations should be allowed to evolve over
time and include their descendants as their own rightful citizens based not
only on blood descendancy, but also based on Aboriginal social, political
and cultural factors. 28 The enactment and administration of the IndianAct
has caused a division within First Nations where non-status Aboriginal
peoples are often discriminated against by their own relatives based
solely on whether they are registered under the Indian Act.
25. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Restructuring the
Relationship, vol. 2 (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 177 [emphasis added]
[hereinafter RCAP, vol.2].
26. Ibid. at 183 [emphasis added].
27. R. v. Sparrow, [1990] 1 S.C.R. 1075.
28. See R. v. Keepness, [1999] S.J. No. 869 online: QL (SJ) (Sask. Prov. Ct.) [hereinafter
Keepness] at para. 10: "All living cultures must be allowed and encouraged to grow, evolve and
take advantage of new technology. The treaties must be interpreted in this light."
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RCAP Commissioners warned that when discussing the rights of
Aboriginal peoples and who the members of these Aboriginal communi-
ties will be, giving the power to choose membership solely to the bands
will mean that a large portion of Aboriginal peoples, mainly the non-
status Indians, will be unfairly excluded.2 9 While the Royal Commission
recognized the legitimacy and indeed the right of Aboriginal nations to
determine their own citizenship or membership, it also recognized that it
should not be an unfettered right.3° The Commission stated that due to the
history of Aboriginal peoples in Canada, namely the lack of sufficient
land bases and resources, this would undoubtedly factor into the member-
ship issue and some nations might be inclined to restrict membership
unfairly.3 ' These factors may well make negotiations under Marshall
more difficult, but the rights of non-status Indians should not be sacrificed
in the interests of a quick deal, as warned by the Royal Commission.
There are many reasons why some bands may discriminate against
their own peoples and have done so for many years, to the detriment of
the non-status groups. The imposition of a foreign governance system
through the Indian Act, the reality that there are only so many homes to
go around, the dependency on federal funding and the fear of having to
share further the limited funds they currently receive under treaty or land
claim agreements, serve to perpetuate the discrimination the non-status
Indians feel from the status Indians, the Crown and non-aboriginal
society. The Crown can no longer be seen to be a part of this discrimina-
tion, nor can it silently acquiesce in any band's further practices of
discrimination. The Crown has positive fiduciary duties, which require
positive action to protect the interests of all Aboriginal peoples, not just
administratively recognized status Indians.32 Legislative extinction is the
grim reality which faces First Nations who base their Aboriginal and
treaty rights upon registration under the Indian Act. Certainly Aboriginal
29. RCAP, vol.2, supra note 25 at 23. Certainly Statistics Canada has recognized the reality
of the non-status group as being part of the Aboriginal make-up of Canada. They have divided
the Aboriginal people of this country into four groups, namely: (1) North American Indians
registered under the Indian Act; (2) North American Indians not registered under the Indian Act
(i.e., non-status population); (3) Mdtis people; and (4) Inuit.
30. See P. Palmater, In the Path of Our Ancestors: The Aboriginal Right to Cross the Canada
- United States Border (LL.M. Thesis, Dalhousie Law School 1999) [unpublished] [hereinaf-
ter Palmater]. I have reviewed the RCAP's findings in my thesis in more detail with regard to
the issue of both treaty and Aboriginal rights.
31. See generally RCAP vol.2, supra note 25 and in particular at 163-84.
32. T will deal with the fiduciary responsibilities of the Crown later in this article. Please see
Part III, "Fiduciary Duty of the Crown and the Survival of a People," below.
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people owe their children seven generations into the future a fighting
chance to maintain not only their Aboriginal and treaty rights, but their
very existence.3
2. Will Existing Rules Lead to the Extinction of First Nations?
Various First Nations advocate the view that their membership and
indeed, Aboriginal and treaty rights, should be restricted to those who
meet the qualifications under the Indian Act or their own membership
codes, many of which mirror the Indian Act provisions. This position has
been criticized not only by the non-status Indians who are excluded, but
also by some native women's organizations who fear the eventual
disappearance of registered Aboriginal peoples through the Indian Act.
There is an obvious danger in basing Aboriginal and treaty rights on
registration under the Indian Act for two reasons: (1) in actuality these
rights come about from practices exercised from time immemorial, long
before the arrival of Europeans and their legislative regimes, and (2) the
assimilationist intentions of the Indian Act will eventually mean the
"extinction" of registered Indians. Stewart Clatworthy and Anthony
Smith in their study entitled Population Implications of the 1985 Amend-
ments to the Indian Act: Final Report,34 show that this reality is less than
a hundred years away for some bands in Canada. With regard to
membership issues arising from self-government plans, the study
concluded,
It has not been our mandate to explore the changes that self government
might make to the registered and member populations. However, this
study raises clear concerns about the principles embedded in the current
Act [Indian Act] and their consequences. Implicit in self government is a
concept of First Nations' citizenship. The Act and the membership codes
that have been developed based on it, provide a problematic basis for this
concept:
33. When I describe the extinction of Aboriginal peoples I am referring to their legislative
extinction-the result of basing Indian status on the current legislative requirements under the
Indian Act. Aboriginal people will continue as Aboriginal people no matter what legislation the
Crown supports, as their identity is tied to culture and heritage and not Crown legislation. But
programs, services, land tenure and Aboriginal and treaty rights can all be negatively affected
by the legislation of who is and is not an "Indian." If there are no more status Indians, who then
will hold reserve land? This is but one of many questions that must be answered as the day draws
near for the extinction of status Indians.
34. S. Clatworthy & A.H. Smith, Population Implications of the 1985 Amendments to the
Indian Act: Final Report. (Winnipeg: Stewart Clatworthy, Anthony Smith, 1992) [hereinafter
Clatworthy].
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*The descent rules that now govern the inheritance of Indian status
appear unsatisfactory as a basis for defining citizenship in self-
governing First Nations. In the long run these rules will lead to the
extinction of First Nations. In shorter term, they will involve the
denial of citizenship to many children and grandchildren.
*The rules in the Act create two "classes" of descendants with
differing rights. They violate the principle of equality of citizens.
*Membership codes adopted under the Act may become the basis
for definitions of First Nations' citizenship. However, with the
exception of the one parent codes, these codes are more restrictive
than the membership provisions of the Act. If restrictive member-
ship codes come to define citizenship, First Nations willauthortheir
own demise. The extinction dates that First Nations write for
themselves by using these codes to define citizenship will be earlier
than those provided by the Act.
*The Act separates political rights from other rights. This approach
then admits political systems in which some have power while
others do not. It also admits political systems in which all share
political power, but only some have access to the other rights and
benefits of Indian status. Citizenship codes that follow this road will
also embrace inequality as an underlying principle.35
This study presents a clear warning of what is to come for First Nations
in Canada if they choose to adopt the same codes as advocated by the
Crown under the Indian Act. It is telling when the statistics bear out
"extinction dates" as opposed to population rates or increases. There is no
such extinction date set for non-aboriginal society, apart from worldwide
disaster. This is a serious wake up call for Aboriginal peoples with a view
to preserving their families, their cultures and their communities. Mem-
bership or citizenship codes are indeed an essential part of self-govern-
ment agreements, but what must be kept in mind are the real implications
of how they design each of their codes. Only the most inclusive codes will
protect Aboriginal nations from certain extinction.36
There are four basic membership codes presently held by First Nations
(bands), namely: (1) one-parent rules, (2) two-parent rules, (3) blood
quantum rules and (4) Indian Act rules. These membership rules are
enacted as per the Indian Act. The one-parent rule means that membership
is determined on the membership of only one of the parents. This rule
appears to be the least restrictive. The two-parent rule states that both
parents must be members. This would mean that out-marriage (marriage
to non-members) would be prohibited if the children were also to be
members. The blood quantum rule means that eligibility for membership
35. Ibid. at viii.
36. Ibid. at 14-16.
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is based on the percentage of "Indian blood" one possesses. The usual
method of establishing these amounts is adding the percent of blood of
each parent and dividing by two. The Indian Act rules are a combination
of the one and two-parent rules although stated in much more detail, and
the effects of these rules are illustrated in the Clatworthy population
predictions. For example, Figure 11 of the study shows the total popula-
tion eligible for membership under a two-parent descent rule, which goes
from approximately 130,000 persons in 1991 to zero persons by 209 1.7
The Indian Act rules and blood quantum rules show an initial rise in
population but then a marked steady decline. It is only the one-parent rule
which shows a substantial increase in population, which levels off and
remains steady by the year 2091. Clatworthy reviews these findings in
more detail in his study and makes the following conclusion about the
Indian Act:
Legislated inequality is not a satisfactory basis for political and social
systems. It violates First Nations traditions which emphasize equal partici-
pation, the enjoyment of resources collectively, and decision making by
consensus. It is fundamentally alien to the democratic principles of the
Canadian political system that wrote the Act. It has the potential to divide
First Nations communities by creating within them fundamental differ-
ences in opportunities and rights. 3
8
Thus, as the statistics illustrate, it is not merely the Marshall case that
makes the beneficiaries issue of prime importance. The very "existence,"
by registration, of First Nations is threatened by the Indian Act and the
membership codes adopted pursuant to the Act.39 While the registration
issues must be dealt with long before the "extinction" date materializes,
so too must the beneficiary status of the treaty be dealt with on both an
interim and long-term basis. As I explain in the next section, if beneficiary
status is based on Indian status, and the latter group will eventually be
extinct, this leaves the Mi'kmaq with less than an empty shell of a treaty
37. Ibid. at 48.
38. Ibid. at 55.
39. Clatworthy, supra note 34. The Clatworthy study used several bands as examples and
predicted their growth/decline rates based on their registration and membership requirements.
The Golden Lake First Nation shows a steady decline in registration numbers from less than
1200 in 1991 down to 500 by the year 2091. Membership numbers start from less than 800 in
1991 and rapidly decrease to near zero by 2091. This is the most drastic of the examples
provided in the study. in addition, this study looked at each First Nation in Canada and
compared each to the different population rates used as examples. The following list represents
those First Nations in Nova Scotia and New Brunswick which were marked as most resembling
the drastic declines as in the Golden Lake First Nation example: Abegweit, Acadia, Beaver
Lake, Eel River, Kingsclear, Saint Mary' s and Tobique. These First Nations are only the most
drastic examples, while the others face similar results, but over longer periods of time.
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promise; it leaves them with nothing at all. This result cannot be said to
reflect the true spirit and intent of the treaty; it represents society's general
devaluation of First Peoples.
3. The 1760 Treaty Affirms the Right of the Mi'kmaq People
The non-status and off-reserve groups have defended their rights as
beneficiaries under the Treaties of 1760-61 against criticism from com-
mercial fishermen and First Nations alike. The Marshall decision has
been used both to support the exclusion of non-status Indians and to
criticize it. The Court did not restrict the protection of the treaty to only
status Mi'kmaq people registered under the Indian Act as "Indians." The
Court held that the "Mi'kmaq people" were the beneficiaries of the treaty
right to sell eel.4' The resulting question is who then are Mi'kmaq people?
In order to make such a determination based in law, it is necessary to look
not just at the Marshall case, but other cases which have addressed this
issue in more detail.4' Recent Supreme Court of Canada cases provide a
compelling argument which supports the rights of non-status Indians to
be included as treaty beneficiaries. Justice Binnie, writing for the major-
ity in Marshall described the treaty right as follows:
In my view, the 1760 treaty does affirm the right of the Mi'kmaq people
to continue to provide for their own sustenance by taking the products of
their hunting, fishing and other gathering activities, and trading for what
in 1760 was termed "necessaries." This right was always subject to
regulation.4"
The Court made several important findings for the "Mi' kmaq people" and
did not limit the territory over which the right could be exercised to a
specific reserve. It is notable that even in the facts the accused was
described as a Mi'kmaq Indian, as opposed to a status Indian, or a
registered band member, associated with a specific band, as many other
cases do.43 The Court could have chosen to describe Marshall in a
40. Marshall, supra note 1. The first Marshall case also made some important comments
about other possible treaty beneficiaries in paragraph 29: "The genesis of the Mi'kmaq trade
clause is therefore found in the Governor's earlier negotiations with the Maliseet and
Passamaquody First Nations." While the second Marshall case clarified the fact that the first
case was about one Mi'kmaq person selling eels, it does provide an indication of how the Court
might view the latter groups bringing similar claims.
41. By this statement I do not suggest that a legal determination of beneficiary status is the
most appropriate method of settling this issue. The best way would always have Aboriginal
participation/direction which involve cultural factors. It is my assertion that a legal analysis
simply assists the non-status groups in their fight for recognition.
42. Marshall, supra note I at para 4.
43. Marshall 2, supra note 8 at para ].The intervener in this case, the West Nova Fishermen's
Coalition, applied for a rehearing of the Crown's regulatory authority over fisheries and for an
order that the Court's judgment dated September 17, 1999, be stayed in the meantime. The
application was dismissed.
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different way in the second Marshall case, but it used such consistent
wording as "Mi'kmaq persons" when referring to who could exercise the
treaty right to fish.4 Presumably the reason why the Court did not
specifically address the issue of who amongst the present-day Mi'kmaq
nation are "entitled" to call themselves Mi'kmaq is that it had already
addressed the issue of determining beneficiaries under a treaty in R. v.
Simon.45 To assume otherwise would leave the Mi'kmaq with an empty
shell of a treaty promise, a result specifically rejected in Marshall:
I do not think an interpretation of events that turns a positive Mi'kmaq
trade demand into a negative Mi'kmaq covenant is consistent with the
honour and integrity of the Crown .... In my view, with respect, the
interpretation adopted by the courts below left the Mi 'kmaq with an empty
shell of a treaty promise.4
The Court in Simon, a Mi'kmaq hunting rights case, based on the Treaty
of 1752, warned against the Crown or lower courts imposing difficult
burdens of proof on Aboriginal claimants to prove their "entitlement"
under a treaty:
The Micmacs did not keep written records. Micmac traditions are largely
oral in nature. To impose an impossible burden of proof would, in effect,
render nugatory any right to hunt that a present day Shubenacadie Micmac
Indian would otherwise be entitled to invoke based on this Treaty.47
The Court held that the test of entitlement to the benefits of a treaty would
be a "sufficient connection" with the signatories to the treaty:
In my view, the appellant has established a sufficient connection with the
Indian band, signatories to the Treaty of 1752.48
The Court then went on to review the evidence that the appellant was a
registered Indian under the Indian Act and a member of a band that
occupied the same general area as that mentioned in the treaty. With
respect to that evidence, the court held:
44. Ibid. at para 38. The court adopted the wording of the Coalition with regard to the holders
of the right. The Court also stated that Marshall could exercise this right of the community.
There was no evidence of community permission or license. The Court also commented on the
criticisms made by the Coalition intervenors about the Constitutional protection of Aboriginal
and treaty rights: "It is the obligation of the courts to give effect to that national commitment.
No useful purpose would be served by a rehearing of this appeal to revisit such fundamental
and incontrovertible principles."
45. [1985) 2 S.C.R. 387 [hereinafter Simon].
46. Marshall, supra note I at para. 52.
47. Simon, supra note 49 at 408.
48. Ibid. at 407 [emphasis added].
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This evidence alone, in my view, is sufficient to prove the appellant's
connection to the tribe originally covered by the Treaty. True, this
evidence is not conclusive proof that the appellant is a direct descendant
of the Micmac Indians covered by the Treaty of 1752. It must, however,
be sufficient, for otherwise no Micmac Indian would be able to establish
descendancy. 49
It is noteworthy that the Court referred to the appellant as a "Micmac
Indian" and also referred to the original Micmac signatories as "Micmac
Indians," knowing of course that in 1752 there was no such practice as
registration under the Indian Act.
The Court laid out a test under Simon that was oblivious to the Indian
Act, other than noting that registration under the Act would be useful as
evidence of beneficiary status. The key in Simon was "descendancy" and
not "registration. '5 As stated above, the same terminology was used in
both Marshall cases and there was no mention that Marshall was
registered as an Indian or that he was a band member. The significance
of the Simon case for non-status Indians is that it established a "sufficient
connection" test which "accepts" (not mandates) proof of Indian status in
a Mi'kmaq band as "sufficient" to establish beneficiary rights under the
treaty but did not preclude the introduction of other evidence. On the
contrary, the Court suggests that for other claimants maybe more would
be needed to prove the "sufficient connection." The "more" evidence that
could be produced to support a sufficient connection could be as little as
a birth certificate that proves direct descendancy from an Aboriginal
person who is a member of a community that was linked to one of the
original treaty signatory groups, such as the Mi'kmaq, Maliseet or
Passamaquoddy, as in the Marshall case. It follows that in Marshall
similar evidence would be required to establish the "sufficient connec-
tion" to the Treaties of1760-61 as a Mi'kmaq beneficiary; a requirement
many non-status people could meet. There have been several lower court
decisions in Ontario and New Brunswick, which have used such a test to
49. Ibid. at 407-408.
50. See also R. v. Nikal, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 1013 at 1059. That is not to say that the Supreme
Court of Canada has never accepted band membership as a link to Aboriginal or treaty rights.
On the contrary, in Nikal at 1059, the court held: "It must also be remembered that aboriginal
rights, by definition, can only be exercised by aboriginal people. Moreover, the nature and
scope of aboriginal rights will frequently be dependent upon membership in particular bands
who have established particular rights in specific localities." Had the Supreme Court meant to
limit beneficiaries to status Indians only, it would have done so. What it did was explain the
reality that there are numerous bands in Canada with specific territories who have proven rights
within that area. That is a far cry from saying that it is only their registered members who can
exercise those rights. The Court specifically left it open to other possibilities by stating that the
test will "frequently" be dependent on membership in a band as opposed to solely dependent.
This is an important distinction when trying to interpret Marshall.
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determine "beneficiary status" under a treaty, which I will discuss in the
next section of this article. This test could be easily incorporated under the
current AFS Agreements to prove the entitlement of non-status Mi'kmaq
treaty descendants to commercial fishing rights under the Treaties of
1760-61.5'
The Supreme Court of Canada in Marshall went to great lengths to
show that the treaty's interpretation would be guided by the understand-
ing of the parties at the time and assisted by using the documents of that
time period. Given that neither the Indian Act nor status cards existed in
1760, and given that the treaty promised these rights to the Mi'kmaq
peoples, it could not now be argued that valid treaty descendants could be
excluded from the protection of the treaty without seriously misreading
Marshall. Canadian courts have been calling for negotiations between
the Crown and Aboriginal peoples about their rights. The Marshall case
was clearly set up to outline the parameters of such negotiations with
regard to the commercial sale of the natural resources protected under the
Treaties of 1760-61. The cases in the next section of this article, coupled
with the broad, liberal interpretive principles set out by the Supreme
Court in the last decade, are examples of how the "sufficient connection"
test could be used to determine "beneficiary status" under the Treaties of
1760-61.52 The Court in Marshall has not come to a conclusion that is
51. While I do not advocate a solely legal method of determining membership/citizenship or
treaty beneficiary status, these cases certainly support a more inclusive approach than has been
adopted by the Crown. This could be one of the negotiated items under a new or revised
agreement between DFO and the non-status groups or DFO, the bands and the non-status
groups together on an interim basis.
52. Marshall, supra note I at para 78. The court in Marshall summarized these liberal
interpretive principles and while it was done in the dissenting decision, it fairly reflects the
principles cited in Supreme Court of Canada cases over the last decade, which are as follows
[citations omitted]: "(1) Aboriginal treaties constitute a unique type of agreement and attract
special principles of interpretation .. . (2) Treaties should be liberally construed and
ambiguities or doubtful expressions should be resolved in favour of the aboriginal signatories
(3) The goal of treaty interpretation is to choose from among the various possible
interpretations of common intention the one which best reconciles the interests of both parties
at the time the treaty was signed... (4) In searching for the common intention of the parties,
the integrity and honour of the Crown is presumed ... (5) In determining the signatories'
respective understanding and intentions, the court must be sensitive to the unique cultural and
linguistic differences between the parties... (6) The words of the treaty must be given the sense
which they would naturally have held for the parties at the time... (7) A technical or contractual
interpretation of treaty wording should be avoided ... (8) While construing the language
generously, courts cannot alter the terms of the treaty by exceeding what "is possible on the
language" or realistic... (9) Treaty fights of aboriginal peoples must not be interpreted in a
static or rigid way. They are not frozen at the date of signature. The interpreting court must
update treaty rights to provide for their modem exercise. This involves determining what
modem practices are reasonably incidental to the core treaty right in its modem context ....
"While this passage is taken from the dissent judgment of Justice McLachlin, it does provide
a good summary of the main principles of interpretation that have come out of the Supreme
Court of Canada in the last decade or so.
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inconsistent with developments in recent lower court decisions or its own
previous decisions relating to Aboriginal and treaty rights.
II. Informing an Analysis of Marshall
1. Non-Registration is Not to be Equated With Non-Entitlement
In R. v. Fowler,53 a New Brunswick court held that in order to be a
beneficiary of the Treaty of 1725-26 (the validity of the treaty was not at
issue) it was sufficient for the accused hunter to show his direct lineage
to his mother, who was a status Indian and a member of a Maliseet band,
a group which could be traced to the original treaty signatories. With
regard to this issue of Fowler not being a registered Indian under the
Indian Act, the Court held:
This evidence all shows that the defendant's ancestors were members of
the St. Mary's Band and Oromocto Band. It further demonstrates that
nonregistration is not to be equated with nonentitlement.54
The Court then held:
In this court's opinion Mr. Joseph Fowler has demonstrated a substantial
connection to the Maliseet people. He has shown that he is a descendant
of the Maliseet Indians; that is, the St. John River Indians. This tribe is
covered by the treaties aforementioned. These treaties do contain the right
to hunt."
The test as to how one could prove their entitlement to the treaty was laid
out by the court as follows:
In this court's opinion a defendant asking for entitlement to benefit from
these treaty rights must establish a sufficient and substantial connection
with a tribe which was signatory to the treaty before the court. This court
finds that Mr. Joseph Fowler has established such a connection to the
Maliseet people. 6
Therefore, the test that was applied was a "sufficient and substantial
connection" test. This was essentially the same test that was found to be
appropriate by the Supreme Court of Canada in Simon. This test holds that
proof of Aboriginal ancestry which directly relates to the tribe or nation
of the original treaty signatories is the basis of proving rights under the
treaty. In other words, the key to exercising treaty rights is establishing
"beneficiary status" as opposed to "registration status."
53. (1993), 134 N.B.R. (2d) 361 (N.B. Prov. Ct.) [hereinafter Fowler].
54. Ibid. at 367 [emphasis added].
55. Ibid. [emphasis added].
56. Ibid. [emphasis added].
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The court in Fowler dealt squarely with the issue of whether only
status Indians were afforded protection under section 35(1) of the
Constitution Act, 1982 and held: "Mr. Fowler, in this court's opinion, is
protected under the Constitution Act."5 The New Brunswick Crown had
argued that if the court allowed Mr. Fowler to take advantage of the treaty
rights, then everyone would "claim" to be an Indian. Yet, the court found
Mr. Fowler not guilty of the hunting charge and with regard to the
floodgates argument put forth by the New Brunswick Crown held that
This will not open the floodgates to unrestricted hunting by everyone
claiming Indian ancestry, because ... each claimant will have to prove a
substantial connection to a signatory of the treaty in question.58
The Province did not appeal the decision in this case. It is likely that the
Provincial Crown knew that given the broad, liberal, interpretive prin-
ciples set down by the Supreme Court of Canada in numerous cases
regarding the interpretation of Aboriginal and treaty rights, it would not
be successful.5 9 The same can be said of Marshall, where neither the
Crown nor the Mi'kmaq had any intention of limiting their beneficiaries
at the time they concluded the Treaties of 1760-61. Such an argument
could not be reconciled with the fact that the Aboriginal and treaty rights
of non-status peoples are constitutionally protected, not based on their
"status" as Indians under the Indian Act, but by their "status" as Aborigi-
nal peoples in Canada. The Ontario courts have also addressed the issue
of administrative or financial arguments against recognition, as being
unfounded.
In R. v. Chevrier,6 ° the Aboriginal appellant had been caught hunting
in violation of Ontario's wildlife legislation. The facts stated that he was
not registered as an Indian under the Indian Act, but was of mixed blood
and traced his ancestry to a signatory of the Robinson-Superior Treaty.
The court reviewed the relevant history and stated that while those of
European descent may have trouble accepting the fact that the accused
57. Ibid.
58. Ibid. at 368 [emphasis added].
59. The following cases have reviewed the liberal interpretive principles of interpreting
treaties and statutes relating to Aboriginal people. These basic principles were also summa-
rized in the dissent in Marshall, supra note 1; Sparrow, supra note 27; Nowegijick v. R., [1983]
1 S.C.R. 29; R. v. Taylor and Williams (1981), 62 C.C.C. (2d) 227 (Ont. C.A.); Jack v. R.,
[1980] 1 S.C.R. 294; Van der Peet, supra note 16; R. v. Adams, [1996] 3 S.C.R. 101;
Delgamuukw v. British Columbia, [1997] 3 S.C.R. 1010 [hereinafter Delgamuukw]; R. v.
Badger, [1996] 1 S.C.R. 771 [hereinafter Badger].
60. [1989] 1 C.N.L.R. 128 (Ont. Dist. Ct.) [hereinafter Chevrier].
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was indeed an Aboriginal person, it was no less true that "[t]his accused
has inherited the right to hunt granted to his ancestors."'6' The court also
addressed the floodgates argument in part as follows:
This decision will not lead to unrestricted hunting by everyone claiming
to have an Indian ancestor because relatively few, other than status
Indians, will be able to prove their descent from a signatory tribe ....
[W]hites who rely upon these resources must do so recognizing that these
resources have come to them subject to prior claims. 62
A similar result can be found in R. v. Powley,63 where a man and his son
defended charges for unlawfully hunting game by providing evidence
that they were Mrtis and as such had valid "Mtis rights" to hunt. Neither
of the men was a status Indian and the provincial wildlife legislation only
excluded status Indians from the application of the Act. The court held
that the Powleys were of mixed ancestry and therefore Mtis, and that the
Mdtis had a right to hunt for food. As a result, there was no justification
for excluding Mdtis rights in the provincial hunting legislation. Vaillancourt
Prov. Ct. J. held:
If the Mrtis exercise their Aboriginal rights without the benefit of a licence,
they not only risk legislative sanctions but they are forced to skulk through
the forests like criminals as opposed to hunters exercising their constitu-
tional rights.64
Here the court made a decision based on descendancy as opposed to
separate rights unique to a M6tis nation. The Superior Court which heard
the appeal recently, upheld the trial judge's findings and held that
extinction for Aboriginal peoples was not an option and set out a test for
Mdtis identification.65 Both Powley and Fowler relied on the previous
Chevrier case which upheld the treaty entitlement of a non-status Indian
who proved a sufficient connection to the tribal signatories. Based on the
Powley case, any position that would in effect treat non-status Indians as
criminals that have to hide their treaty activities for fear of prosecution,
would not meet with a favourable response from the courts.66 The Ontario
61. Ibid. at 130.
62. Ibid.
63. [ 1999] 1 C.N.L.R. 153 (Ont. Prov. Ct.) [hereinafter Powley]. Aftd Powley, appeal, supra
note 14.
64. Ibid. at 155 [emphasis added].
65. Powley, appeal, supra note 14. The court stated in paragraph 16: "Surely, at the heart of
s.35(1 ), lies a recognition that aboriginal rights are a matter of fundamental justice protecting
the survival of aboriginal people, as people, on their lands."
66. Ibid. They also went on to uphold the legitimacy of M~tis political organizations in
paragraph 30: "To deny people access to their constitutional rights because a community may
now only be beginning to put together aspects of its identity and culture is to reward the very
practices that the statement of reconciliation admits were wrong."
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Superior Court which recently upheld this decision agreed with the trial
judge that it was time to deal with the fights of M6tis peoples in a fair and
just manner through discussions, consultations and negotiation.
It is interesting to note the fact that Donald Marshall Jr. was living off-
reserve at the time he was charged. There was also no indication that he
was fishing for the benefit of his community or under authority from his
community.67 He was an individual Mi'kmaq person exercising his right
to fish for eel and sell it under the Treaties of 1760-61.6' The Crown's
argument that community authority is a prerequisite for exercising treaty
rights and that the Aboriginal community is an Indian Act band, does not
correspond with the current legislation and case law regarding the powers
of bands in Canada. In the recent Bernard case, the defendant's lawyer,
Bruce Wildsmith (who was also Marshall's lawyer), questions the
Crown's assumptions with regard to band powers to control the treaty
harvest of wood and compares it to the treaty fishery. He explains that it is
not clear who or how community governmental powers [arel to be
exercised today with respect to harvesting wood outside the bounds of a
reserve-the Eel Ground and Red Bank Bands achieve their legal recog-
nition through the Indian Act, which specifies what powers may be
exercised by them. The Indian Act lists the powers of Band Councils in
ss.81, 83 and 85.1. No power conferred with reference to timber or wood.
And even if there was such a power, it would only apply within the
boundaries of the reserve. There is no recognized power for a Band to
regulate activities of its members off-reserve.69
67. Marshall 2, supra note 8. In the "clarification" of the original Marshall decision, the court
did expand on what it meant as to the exercise of the right to sell fish. They stated that this right
was communal and could only be exercised by a member of a Mi'kmaq community under
authority of that community. The court did not define what the test was for establishing (1) an
Aboriginal community, (2) community membership or (3) what authority was required to fish.
Therefore Marshall cannot be said to stand for the proposition that only status registered band
members of a Mi'kmaq band can exercise the right under the Treaties of 1760-61.
68. Marshall, supra note 1. See also R. v. Bernard, [2000] N.B.J. No. 138 online: QL (NBJ)
(Written Summary of Oral argument, defendant) Ihereinafter Bernard], where the lawyer for
the defendant, Bruce Wildsmith, maintains that there has never been a requirement that an
individual defendant must have community permission to exercise his or her Aboriginal or
treaty rights. He also stated on page 3 of his oral submissions that community permission was
"not required in or part of any evidence in any native rights case-not in Marshall, Simon,
Badger, Gladstone, etc."
69. Bernard, ibid. at 3 [emphasis added].
128 The Dalhousie Law Journal
Wildsmith then goes on to cite R. v. Lewis,70 a recent Supreme Court of
Canada case that dealt with band authority over the fishery and held that
this power was never the intention of Parliament when it enacted the
Indian Act. The Court in Lewis explained that
If Parliament had intended to grant regulatory powers to Indian Band
Councils beyond the limits of their reserves, it would have specifically
provided for such powers. The interpretation proposed by the appellants
would create numerous and difficult uncertainties which would not, in my
view, have been the intention of Parliament....
An expansive interpretation of the by-law-making power would also
create the problem of determining the "off-reserve" reach of a by-law....
... Ibelieve it is clear that Parliament's intention in enacting s. 81 (1) as a
whole and in particular paragraph (o) was to provide a mechanism by
which Band Councils could assume management over certain activities
within the territorial limits of their constituencies....
[A] correct interpretation of s. 81 (1)(o) of the Indian Act allows the by-law
to be applied only within the actual reserve boundaries and therefore it
does not extend to the River.7'
While I agree with Wildsmith's analysis, it is important to distinguish
between the powers of band councils within the Indian Act and the powers
of Aboriginal nations that may result from future land claims agreements
or self-government agreements. The point still stands that on the one
hand, the Crown objects to band powers regulating natural resources
beyond the reserve boundaries, yet on the other hand, the Crown seeks to
rely on those same powers to control the native fishery off-reserve.
Despite these recent court rulings, non-status Aboriginal people are
still made to feel inferior or less worthy than those registered under the
Indian Act as Indians. Non-status Indians in New Brunswick and Nova
Scotia have been characterized as criminals in the media by the non-
aboriginal fishers who condemn the Treaties of 1760-61 outright. They
are also discriminated against by some of the Chiefs and the status groups
who fear sharing the resource. One Aboriginal lawyer, when speaking of
the non-status Indians after the Marshall case, went so far as to say: "As
far as we are concerned, they are fishing illegally."72 The bands cannot
ask the Crown to make the choice of who Aboriginal people are for the
purposes of treaty beneficiary lists, as the responsibility also rests with
them. The Crown has a general fiduciary duty towards all Aboriginal
70. [1996] 1 S.C.R. 921.
71. Ibid. atparas. 78-81.
72. S. Hughes, "Illegal Fishing Threat Floated" The [Halifax] Chronicle Herald (23
September 1999) at A-2.
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people which demands fairness, respect and honourable dealings.73
Those who would advocate that non-status peoples be prohibited from
exercising their rights under the Treaties of 1760-61, would force non-
status Indians to feel like criminals when they participate in their
traditional hunting and fishing activities.7 4 When this happens, they are
denied their human dignity. Nowhere in the Indian Act does it purport to
assume control over the beneficiaries issue for land claims, self-govern-
ment, Aboriginal or treaty rights. That right vests with the Aboriginal
peoples themselves to control membership in a fair and inclusive manner
in keeping with traditional values and a protectionist view of future
generations. If the Crown is going to unilaterally assume this duty, it must
at least do so with its fiduciary duties in mind.75
73. The more recent case of Blueberry River Indian Band v. Canada (Department of Indian
Affairs and Northern Development) (1999), 171 F.T.R. 91 (Sask.) dealt with distinction
between band membership under the Indian Act and entitlement to treaty rights by virtue of
membership in a First Nation. While the decision of the Federal Court in this case is problematic
on other issues, best left for another article, it did make a notable distinction on para. 27:
"Membership in a first nation, and the enjoyment of any aboriginal and treaty rights which may
flow from such membership, is quite different from membership in a Band and the enjoyment
of the rights which flow from that status. Of course, the two may and often do overlap, but that
does not make them the same."
74. Powley, supra note 63 at 155. InPowley, appeal, supra note 14atpara. 64, the court varied
the test set out at trial, that addresses the identity issue for Mftis which is relevant to my
discussion on non-status Indians: "A Mftis is a person who, (a) has some ancestral family
connection (not necessarily genetic), (b) identifies himself or herself as Mftis and (c) is
accepted by the Mftis community or a locally-organized community branch, chapter or council
of a Mftis association or organization with which that person wishes to be associated." See also
R. v. Howse, [2000] B.C.J. No. 905 online: QL (BCJ) (B.C. Prov. Ct.), where Waurynchuk
Prov. Ct. J. cited the Powley case in support of his finding that certain accused were M~tis, and
adopted the test set out in Powley. He found that Mftis as Aboriginal Peoples have an
Aboriginal right to hunt for food. Notable were his comments at para. 31 regarding the
treatment they have received as Aboriginal people: "All of the defendants share a common
ancestry, common family upbringing, common association with shame, ostracization, and
discrimination, common hunting, fishing and food gathering experiences. Unfortunately they
all experienced the unnecessary inappropriate comments of the conservation officers." He
went on to state in the same paragraph: "The evidence establishes that Mftis people have
suffered discrimination and prejudice from all sides including the inequality of treatment by
provincial governments across Canada. Specifically, the inequality of treatment by the
Wildlife Conservation officers and their political masters. It would be difficultif not impossible
for the British Columbia Provincial Government and the Wildlife Branch to argue that they
have not had enough time since the coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982 to set up
a process to determine the practice, customs or traditions of aboriginal M6tis claims ......
75. 1 will briefly discuss the fiduciary duty of the Crown towards Aboriginal people later on
in this article. Please see Part II, "Fiduciary Duty of the Crown and the Survival of a People,"
below.
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2. Endemic Practice of Discrimination Against Non-status Indians
Judges, professors and Aboriginal peoples are not the only ones to have
commented on the discrimination felt by Aboriginal people as a whole.
Even the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples (RCAP) found room
to comment on the discrimination and poor social conditions of off-
reserve Aboriginal people, also referred to as "urban Indians." In addi-
tion, the lower courts of this country have also takenjudicial notice of the
discrimination felt by the non-status groups in particular. One lower court
judge found out that even mentioning these bleak realities for non-status
Indians has not met with a favourable response. The Lovelace case,
discussed below, is judicial testimony to the current atmosphere in
Ontario for the non-status groups. The Ontario Court of Appeal in
Lovelace v. Ontario, overturned the motions judge's decision in favour
of the non-status Indian organizations who felt they were unfairly left out
of the benefits of the provincial Casino Rama project signed by the
government with only the First Nations (in the "band" sense). The Appeal
Court felt that the motions judge was biased in his view of the Ontario
Crown:
Most notably, it is manifested in a suspicious attitude toward the govern-
ment that caused him to misapprehend some of the evidence before him.
76
This conclusion came about as the motions judge had made some
important comments about the way in which the Ontario government has
treated non-status Indians:
The evidence, I find, establishes an institutionalized, endemic practice of
discrimination against non-status Aboriginals by Ontario; it is preposter-
ous of Ontario to argue that the project is consistent with the ultimate goal
of ending discrimination; on the contrary, the project serves to magnify the
unfairness and disadvantages experienced by non-status Aboriginals.77
76. Lovelace v. Ontario (1997), 33 O.R. (3d) 735 at 748, [1998] 2 C.N.L.R. 36 at para. 38
(C.A.) [hereinafter Lovelace appeal]. The appeal court overturned the trial decision at [1997]
1 C.N.L.R. 66 (Ont. Ct. Gen. Div.) [hereinafter Lovelace trial].
77. Lovelace trial, supra note 76 at 76 [emphasis added]. After Lovelace, appeal, supra note
76, appeal dismissed, [2000] S.C.J. No. 36, online QL (SCJ). Even though the non-status
groups lost at the Supreme Court, I would submit that it only stands for the government's ability
to participate in affirmative action type programs to benefit certain groups of Aboriginal
people. This does not equate to non-status Indians not having other rights under the Indian Act,
the Constitution Act, 1982, or otherwise.
An Empty Shell of a Treaty Promise: R. v. Marshalland the Rights of Non-Status Indians 131
It is notable that no court made the same accusation of the Supreme Court
of Canada in Sparrow, when it took notice of threatening government
objectives towards Aboriginal people:
Our history has shown, unfortunately all too well, that Canada's aborigi-
nal peoples are justified in worrying about government objectives that may
be superficially neutral but which constitute de facto threats to the
existence of aboriginal rights and interests."8
In actuality, the motions judge in Lovelace seems to have assessed the
situation quite accurately by Supreme Court standards. Suffice it to say
that the courts of this country and RCAP have noted the poor treatment
afforded Canada's Aboriginal peoples and the double discrimination felt
by non-status Indians. The very word "non-status" itself denotes a people
without a position in this society; a people without any status at all, be it
in the non-aboriginal world or the Aboriginal world. How can it be said
that it is not discrimination when many parties involved in the Marshall
case hold that non-status Indians are little more than a people without
"status"; a non-status Indian? The fact remains that these Aboriginal
people are connected to both the First Nations of this land and the land
itself, no less so than the government's "registered" Aboriginal peoples.79
The following case from the Supreme Court of Canada condemns this
kind of discrimination and its ratio is arguably applicable to the plight of
the non-status Indians under Marshall.
3. Disenfranchisement is Discriminatory
The Corbiere8° case sets out a clearer method by which the non-status
groups may make their claim that their disentitlement, based on the
second-generation cut-off rule under the Indian Act registration provi-
sions, is discriminatory, violates section 15(1) of the Canadian Charter
of Rights and Freedoms and cannot be saved under section 1 of the
Charter. The success of this kind of claim could bring many non-status
Indians under the jurisdiction of the Indian Act, and therefore give them
"automatic" treaty beneficiary status if the test under Marshall is going
to be status Indians only. That is why the Corbiere case is so important
78. Sparrow, supra note 26 at 1110 [emphasis added].
79. Indian Act, R.S.C. 1985, c. 1-5, as am. by R.S.C. 1985, c.32 (tst Supp.), s. 4. This
legislation has also been referred to as "Bill C-3 ." While the term "off-reserve" has always
been synonymous with non-status, the amendments to the Indian Act which reinstated many
non-status women, commonly referred to as Bill C-31, now means that the off-reserve are
comprised of large numbers of both status and non-status Indians. The unfortunate part of
reinstatement for many was that they were still discriminated against and prevented from
participating at the band level.
80. Corbiere v. Canada (Minister of Indian and Northern Affairs), [1999] 2 S.C.R. 203
[hereinafter Corbierel.
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in this analysis of treaty beneficiaries as well as for its important
comments about this kind of discrimination felt within Aboriginal
groups. In Corbiere, the non-resident members of the Batchewana Band
sought a declaration that section 77(1) of the IndianAct, which stated that
only residents who were ordinarily resident on the reserve could vote in
band elections, violated the right to equal protection under the law as set
out in s. 15 (1) of the Charter. The Supreme Court held that the exclusion
of off-reserve band members infringed their s. 15 Charter rights and
could not be saved under s. 1. The Court also held that this distinction,
made under the Indian Act, was not based on merit, but rather, determined
rights based solely on race and residency. Residency was considered a
personal characteristic that could be changed only with great expense,
and in some cases was not changeable at all. The Court dealt squarely with
the reality that there is little money provided to the bands for housing on
reserves and most of the off-reserve members were already settled in their
homes off the reserve. A move to accommodate the statutory requirement
that they can vote only if ordinarily resident on the reserve would mean
dragging their children out of school, moving away from their local
places of employment and uprooting whole families. This kind of
sacrifice was found to be a personal characteristic which was only
changeable, if at all, with great expense. The off-reserve members were
found to be part of a "discrete and insular minority", defined by race and
place of residence, who had experienced disadvantage and prejudice at
the hands of the non-aboriginal majority. The Indian Act served to
perpetuate this disadvantage and treat them as "less worthy" and "less
Aboriginal."
Noteworthy was the Court's comment that administrative and finan-
cial difficulties held up by the Crown as a defence to recognizing their
rights, could not justify a complete denial of a constitutionally protected
right. Even the historical justifications that consisted of wiping out the
"Indian enemy," or "assimilating" Indians into the population in order to
"rid" the country of the Indian problem,8 could not be used by the Crown
today given the principles of good faith, honour, and fiduciary duty
towards all Aboriginal peoples. The same analysis could be made with
respect to the discrimination experienced by non-status peoples in the
exercise of their treaty rights under Marshall. The issue is whether
81. New England History, Letters of Colonel Thomas Westbrook and Others, Documentary
History of the State of Maine, vol.47: "Attack them with your best courage and conduct and
do your utmost to take, kill and destroy them .... By all possible means, find out, suppress,
and destroy the Indian enemy." See also generally Gilbert, supra note 23.
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discrimination based on non-registration under the Indian Act that has the
effect of preventing persons from exercising valid treaty rights would be
considered an analogous ground for a section 15 challenge. Not only are
status Indians who live off reserve prevented from partaking in the culture
and governance of the status members who live on reserve, so too are the
non-status Indians prevented from exercising those same rights. Any
decision to exclude them would be an arbitrary one based on outdated
ethnocentric ideals not in keeping with Aboriginal cultural and human
rights. That kind of decision by the Crown may well be found to be
without merit and notjustifiable under section 1 of the Charter by the next
court who hears the issue.
The argument was raised in Corbiere that, since section 15 of the
Charter relates to everyone and that a claim by the off-reserve would be
based on discrimination that affects only that small group, the claim
would not be permitted. The Court's response would be equally appli-
cable to the issue currently facing non-status Indians:
[W]e note that the analogous ground of off-reserve status or Aboriginality-
residence is limited to a subset of the Canadian population, while s. 15 is
directed at everyone. In our view, this is no impediment to its inclusion as
an analogous ground under s. 15.82
Therefore the non-status groups would not be prohibited from arguing
that discrimination based on registration, blood quantum or parental
registration are analogous grounds by virtue of being a subset of Aborigi-
nal people in Canada. The Court also cited at length from RCAP the
sections which emphasized the importance of maintaining cultural ties
82. Supra note 80 at para. 15. Lovelace v. Ontario, supra note 77. While the Supreme Court
of Canada dismissed the appeal by Lovelace, they did so on the narrow issue of the ability of
the provincial government to exercise its constitutional spending power in making casino
arrangements and did not touch on "Indianness".The Court did not hold that non-status groups
were not to be considered Aboriginal peoples, but were Aboriginal peoples with the same
history as registered First Nations. Justice lacobucci specifically noted the systemic discrimi-
nation felt by these Aboriginal groups in paragraph 6: "With respect to s. 15(1), in my view the
exclusion of the non-band aboriginal communities from the First Nations Fund does not violate
s. 15 of the Charter. I reach this conclusion despite a recognition that, regrettably, the appellant
and respondent aboriginal communities have overlapping and largley shared histories of
discrimination, poverty, and systemic disadvantage that cry out for improvement." The Court
also emphasized the fact that there was no dispute as to the appellant's aboriginality or self-
identification. Specifically, Justice tacobucci explained in paragraph 10: "Indeed, this is a case
which immediately invokes a deep appreciation for the diversity of Canada's aboriginal
population... Given this complexity, it is neither possible nor desirable to draw bright lines
between or among any of the aboriginal communities involved in these proceedings." Finally
the Court reiterated that the appellants' basic claims were supported by the Court in Corbiere
and RCAP and held in paragraph 90: "Again, I acknowledge that the appellant aboriginal
communities have experienced layer upon layer of exclusion and discrimination."
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despite being forced, through the Indian Act, to be separate from one's
community. Some of the Court's cited passages from RCAP include
comments about the importance of identity to Aboriginal people as a
whole:
Throughout the Commission's hearings, Aboriginal people stressed the
fundamental importance of retaining and enhancing their cultural identity
while living in urban areas. Aboriginal identity lies at the heart of
Aboriginalpeoples'existence; maintaining that identity is an essential and
self-validating pursuit for Aboriginal peoples in cities.83
... Identification with an ancestral place is important to urban people
because of the associated ritual, ceremony and traditions, as well as the
people who remain there, the sense of belonging, the bond to an ancestral
community, and the accessibility of family, community and elders.'
This is the very claim that the non-status Indians make who are prevented
by legislation, policy and enforcement measures from keeping that
connection with their families, elders and commuhiities based on little
more than an outdated policy designed to assimilate Indians into the
larger society. This legislation discriminates against non-status Indians
and prevents them from exercising their basic human rights to be
recognized as part of one's community. Aboriginal identity is truly the
basis of Aboriginal peoples' existence and dignity. Take away their
identity and you have killed a people; a loss I do not think can be tolerated
in the age of internationally recognized human rights and cultural
protection.
Poor economic conditions, the Indian Act and strict rules relating to
funding, make it difficult from an economic perspective for the bands to
accept these people, even if they wanted to put them on their membership
lists. With regard to the above comments by RCAP, the Supreme Court
held that this engages the dignity aspect of the s. 15 analysis and results
in the denial of substantive equality:
Taking all this into account, it is clear that the s.77(1) disenfranchisement
is discriminatory. It denies off-reserve band members the right to partici-
pate fully in band governance on the arbitrary basis of a personal charac-
teristic. It reaches the cultural identity of off-reserve Aboriginals in a
stereotypical way. It presumes that Aboriginals living off-reserve are not
interested in maintaining meaningful participation in the band or in
preserving their cultural identity, and are therefore less deserving mem-
bers of the band. 85
83. Canada, Report of the Royal Commission on Aboriginal Peoples: Perspectives and
Realities, vol. 4, (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1996) at 521 [hereinafter RCAP, vol.4]
[emphasis added].
84. Ibid. at 525 [emphasis added].
85. Corbiere, supra note 80 at para. 18 [emphasis added].
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The Court also noted that the off-reserve group were the objects of
discrimination and constituted an underprivileged group:
The political rights in question are related to the race of the individuals
affected, and to their cultural identity.
86
This fact is no less true for the non-status Indians and it is perhaps even
more so in their case. The political rights affected by the Indian Act for
the off-reserve are comparable to those of the non-status who are
completely denied any cultural or political participation at all. The
Supreme Court also found that this discrimination, while rationally
connected to the aim, namely to give a voice to those members most
affected by band decisions, could not be saved under section 1:
The restriction of s. 15 rights is however not justified under the second
branch of the s.1 test; it has not been demonstrated that s. 77(1) of the
Indian Act impairs the s.15 rights minimally.17
Therefore, valid aims can be saved under section 1, if the effect of the
legislation minimally impairs the rights of the offended group. Not only
is this fact not true for the non-status groups, but it actually affects them
in the most intrusive way; it legislates the total denial of all participation,
benefits and, most importantly, recognition for themselves and their
children. One would be hard pressed to imagine a law that could be more
offensive to one's right to participate in culture and community, than a
total denial of those rights.
The right to be recognized as an Aboriginal member of one's commu-
nity, and the right to participate in its governance and culture is as
essential to a non-status Indian, as it is for a status Indian. Pride, self-
worth and dignity are directly related to how one self-identifies. The
Supreme Court in Corbiere cited Law v. Canada (Minister of Employ-
ment and Immigration) with regard to the issue of human dignity:
Human dignity means that an individual or group feels self-respect and
self-worth.... Human dignity is harmed by unfair treatment premised on
personal traits or circumstances which do not relate to individual needs,
capacities or merits .... Human dignity is harmed when individuals and
groups are marginalized, ignored, or devalued.... 88
The non-status groups have cried upon deaf ears and yet still fight for their
cultural, political and human rights to be recognized and respected. For
many non-status Indians, the decision to live off the reserve, or not
participate in their community's governance or cultural activities, is not
86. Ibid. at para. 19.
87. Ibid. at para. 21.
88. Law v. Canada (Minister of Employment and Immigration), [ 1999] 1 S.C.R. 497 at para.
53 [emphasis added].
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a choice they made of their own volition, but one that was forced upon
them by the Indian Act without regard to their rights. This Act has the
effect of cutting off these Aboriginal people from their families and
making an arbitrary distinction between siblings, cousins, parents and
other family members based solely on personal characteristics, qualifica-
tion under the Indian Act, blood quantum and the status of one's parents
to pass on "status." This kind of distinction is without merit and offensive
in the highest degree and has led to discrimination by society as a whole
towards non-status Indians, a condition similar to that of the off-reserve
as noted in Corbiere:
First, band members living off-reserve form part of a "discrete and insular
minority," defined by both race and residence, which is vulnerable and has
at times not been given equal consideration or respect by the government
or by others in Canadian orAboriginal society. Decision makers have not
always considered the perspectives and needs of Aboriginal people living
off reserves, particularly their Aboriginal identity and their desire for
connection to their heritage and cultural roots.8 9
Registration is treated as a statutory privilege akin to obtaining moose
hunting licenses, an arbitrary luck of the draw. Yet, beneficiary status
should be more akin to Aboriginal familial, social and cultural associa-
tions much the same as a child would be considered part of a family
simply by birth, adoption or association. The right to call one's grand-
child a grandchild, does not cease after the second generation, and indeed
this would be unspeakable in the non-aboriginal community. The Su-
preme Court of Canada in Corbiere specifically noted the details of the
prevailing stereotypical attitudes about what makes a "true" Aboriginal
person:
People have often been only seen as "truly Aboriginal" if they live on
reserves. The Royal Commission wrote:
Many Canadians think of Aboriginal people as living on reserves or
at least in rural areas. This perception is deeply rooted and persis-
tently reinforced. . . . There is a history in Canada of putting
Aboriginal people 'in their place' on reserves and in rural commu-
nities. Aboriginal cultures and mores have been perceived as incom-
patible with the demands of industrialized urban society. This leads
all too easily to the assumption that Aboriginal people living in
urban areas must deny their culture and heritage in order to suc-
ceed-that they must assimilate into this other world. 90
89. Corbiere, supra note 80 at para. 71 [emphasis added].
90. Ibid. [emphasis added].
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Like the denial of voting rights for off-reserve band members, the
stereotype given to Aboriginal people as noted above, namely that unless
they live on a reserve, they must assimilate into the "other world," has
gone from a stereotypical view by society to an enforced legislative
regime under the Indian Act.
The Indian Act has reinforced this view that to be "truly Aboriginal"
one must be registered under the Act and live on a reserve. This Act is
based not on merit, but solely on a policy that was specifically designed
to assimilate Indians into the "other world." These policies come with a
heavy price, as non-status Indians suffer the same feelings of isolation,
marginalization, depression and disconnection as other off-reserve Indi-
ans. The choice has been taken from non-status Indians as to whether they
want to live near their communities or participate in their governance.
This makes the discrimination for non-status Indians all the worse, as it
did for the off-reserve in Corbiere:
It~he fact that those affected or their ancestors may well have had no choice
but to leave the reserve signals that the interest in keeping a connection
with the band of which they are members is particularly important to them
because the separation from other members of the band and the reserve
may well have been undesired or unchosen.9'
The Court also reviewed the past and present policies of the Crown and
held that:
[t]his history shows that Aboriginal policy, in the past, often led to the
denial of status and the severing of connections between band members
and the band. It helps show why the interest in feeling and maintaining a
sense of belonging to the band free from the barriers imposed by Parlia-
ment is an important one for all band members, and especially for those
who constitute a significant portion of the group affected, who have been
directly affected by these policies and are now living away from reserves,
in part, because of them.9 2
With regard to non-status treaty rights under Marshall, Corbiere and the
RCAP provide indicators as to how to deal with the issue. There is still
an opportunity to sit down and work out solutions to these issues. The
courts have also impressed upon the Crown the need to negotiate these
issues with Aboriginal peoples as opposed to repeatedly seeking resolu-
tion through litigation. The fiduciary duty of the Crown to behave in a fair
and reasonable fashion with regard to the rights of Aboriginal people
mandates that a new plan of action be introduced to meet this obligation
on the part of the Crown.
91. Ibid. at para. 84 [emphasis added].
92. Ibid. at para. 89 [emphasis added].
138 The Dalhousie Law Journal
III. Fiduciary Duty of the Crown and the Survival of a People
1. The Honour of All Canadians is Also at Stake
Even if there were some doubt on the part of the Crown as to whether the
heirs of the treaty signatories include the present-day non-status descen-
dants, the fiduciary duty of the Crown and the liberal interpretive
principles outlined by the courts, mandate that they be included. The
court in Van der Peet was very clear about this fact:
Because of this fiduciary relationship, and its implication of the honour of
the Crown, treaties, s. 35(1), and other statutory and constitutional
provisions protecting the interests of aboriginal peoples, must be given a
generous and liberal interpretation [cite omitted]. This general principle
must inform the Court's analysis of the purposes underlying s. 35(1), and
of that provision's definition and scope.
The fiduciary relationship of the Crown and aboriginal peoples also means
that where there is any doubt or ambiguity with regards to what falls within
the scope and definition of s. 35(1), such doubt or ambiguity must be
resolved in favour of aboriginal peoples.93
Before a decision can be made with regard to the rights of non-status
Indians as treaty descendants, there must be, at a minimum, a process of
meaningful consultation with the Aboriginal groups affected. There
currently exist Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy agreements with the non-
status groups after an Aboriginal food fishery right was upheld in
Sparrow. It would follow then, that since a treaty right to sell the fish has
been upheld by the Supreme Court in Marshall, that negotiations would
be the best way to work out an agreement with the non-status groups as
to its scope. The Supreme Court in Delgamuukw94 set out the rules for
consultation which basically held that the more intrusive the measure, the
more strenuous must be the consultation. The non-status groups are
asking for consultation and negotiation of this recently recognized treaty
right to sell fish for a moderate livelihood. The Supreme Court stated that
true reconciliation of Crown sovereignty with the constitutionally pro-
tected rights of Aboriginal peoples is best achieved through good faith
negotiations. This duty is not just a duty to act in good faith once
negotiations have begun, but also a duty to enter into negotiations in the
first place. With regard to these good faith negotiations, the Supreme
Court of Canada in Delgamuukw held:
93. Van der Peer, supra note 13 at paras. 24-25 [emphasis added].
94. Supra note 59.
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Moreover, the Crown is under a moral, if not a legal, duty to enter into and
conduct those negotiations in good faith. Ultimately, it is through negoti-
ated settlements, with good faith and give and take on all sides, reinforced
by thejudgments of this court, that we will achieve what I stated in Van der
Peet, supra at para. 31, to be a basic purpose of s. 35(l)-"the reconcili-
ation of the pre-existence of aboriginal societies with the sovereignty of
the Crown." 11
Canada is not the only country that is currently dealing with the issue of
the scope of fiduciary duty towards Aboriginal peoples. The Walley96
case from Australia lists several indicators of bad faith on the part of the
Crown in dealing with Aboriginal peoples during negotiations which
were summarized as follows:
- failure to make a proposal in the first place,
- failing to respond to reasonable requests for relevant information
within a reasonable time,
- shifting position just as agreement seems in sight, and
- adopting a rigid non-negotiable position .... 97
These are but a few of the indicators. The courts in this country have not
yet made a list of what is bad faith in terms of negotiations and it is hoped
that they will never have to make one. Recently, Stuart Rush in his paper
An Update to the Duty to Consult and the Duty to Bargain on Good
Faith,98 explained the recent Halfway River9 9 case and its characteriza-
tion of this duty as a positive obligation:
The majority confirmed the general law that the Crown's duty to consult
imposes on it a positive obligation to reasonably ensure that Aboriginal
peoples are provided with all necessary information in a timely way so that
they have an opportunity to express their interests and concern, and to
ensure that their representations are seriously considered and, wherever
possible, demonstrably integrated into the proposed plan of action."°
95. Ibid. at para. 186 [emphasis added].
96. Walley v. Western Australia (1996), 67 F.C.R. 366 (Fed. Ct. Aus.); (1996), 137 A.L.R.
561.
97. S. Rush, Q.C., "An Update on the Duty to Consult and the Duty toBargain in Good Faith'
(Annual Aboriginal Law Conference, Vancouver, 23-24 September 1999) at 14-15 [hereinaf-
ter Rush]. These are just some of the items that Rush listed in his paper as being indicative of
bad faith negotiations.
98. Ibid. at 14-15.
99. Halfway River First Nation v. B.C. (1999), 64 B.C.L.R. (3d) 206 (B.C.C.A.) at para. 160.
100. Rush, supra note 101 at 5.
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Principles like good faith and honour should act as a constant and
consistent measure of the tone of the Crown's dealings with Aboriginal
peoples whether in negotiations or other dealings such as treaty interpre-
tations. The Court in Marshall again stressed this point:
As this and other courts have pointed out on many occasions, the process
of accommodation of the treaty right may best be resolved by consultation
and negotiation of a modern agreement for participation in specified
resources by the Mi'kmaq rather than by litigation. The Chief Justice
emphasized in [Delgamuukw] ... at para. 207:
On a final note, I wish to emphasize that the best approach in these
types of cases is a process of negotiation and reconciliation that
properly considers the complex and competing interests at stake.
The various governmental, aboriginal and other interests are not, of
course, obliged to reach an agreement. In the absence of a mutually
satisfactory solution, the courts will resolve the points of conflict as they
arise case by case.'0°
The need for immediate consultations and negotiations cannot be stressed
enough. The honour of our country is at stake, as noted recently by a court
in Saskatchewan:
In a democracy such [as] Canada, when the honour of the federal Crown
is at stake, the honour of all Canadians is also at stake.1
0 2
There have yet to be any unreasonable claims advanced by the off-reserve
and non-status groups to the fishery resource. At the same time, these
groups cannot keep waiting on the sidelines hoping that the Crown will
deal with them in good faith and commence negotiations. For these
groups, they have been waiting long enough for recognition, respect and
a fair chance to advance their claims.
The Congress of Aboriginal Peoples (CAP) have recently decided that
they can no longer be ignored by the Crown in their pursuit to protect the
rights of off-reserve M6tis and non-status Indians and have brought an
action against the federal Crown. It is interesting to note that one of the
items they thought most important was a declaration that
The MNtis and non-status Indian people of Canada have the right to be
negotiated with in good faith by the Federal Government.... 03
In addition, they have asked for declarations that they are Indians within
the meaning of section 91(24) of the Constitution Act, 1867. They also
seek a declaration that the Federal Crown owes them a fiduciary duty as
101. Marshall 2, supra note 8 at paras. 22-23 [emphasis added].
102. Keepness, supra note 32 at note 3.
103. Congress of Aboriginal Peoples v. Canada (Minister of Indian Affairs and Northern
Development, Attorney General) (14 December 1999) T-2172-99 (Fed. Ct.) (Statement of
Claim, Plaintiffs) at para. 25(c).
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Aboriginal peoples. Their requested declaration states that a refusal by
the Crown to negotiate in good faith with this group violates: (1) their
Aboriginal rights under s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982; (2) the
fiduciary duty owed to them as Aboriginal people; (3) their equality rights
under section 15(1) of the Charter; and (4) Canada's principles of
democracy and respect for minorities. If Marshall was an indication of
the need for open discussions between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples,
the CAP claim certainly raises some serious issues for this country.
Society and government can no longer hold firm and hope that the courts
will hold in their favour. The reality in 2000 is that if the CAP claim is not
successful, there will be other claims until the courts resolve these issues.
Is this what was intended by the Treaties of 1760-61 or was something
more than litigation in the minds of our ancestors?
The Supreme Court of Canada in Badger held with regard to treaty
interpretation that the courts must pick an interpretation of the treaty that
gives effect to the understanding of the parties at the time of its signa-
ture. 10 4 When dealing with any Aboriginal accused or claimant, the
Supreme Court in Gladue °5 "urged the courts to take judicial notice of
the historical factors which have led to the current circumstances in which
Indians find themselves."1 6 Certainly, no Aboriginal nation in this
country could have contemplated that the Crown would enact legislation
to tell the nations who their members would be for the purposes of
exercising treaty rights. The historical fact is that any current political
divisions among Aboriginal people have been created by the Government's
actions, laws and policies around the Indian Act and that cannot now be
used as a defence to limiting treaty beneficiaries under Marshall. The
chain of treaties signed by the Mi' kmaqin the 1700s referred to their heirs
and descendants forever. There is no ambiguity in these words and even
if there were the courts are obligated to interpret it in favour of the
Aboriginal claimant and hold that the intention was to include treaty
descendants as they knew them at the time. Those descendants would be
not only their current members but also those that were adopted into the
community and born of the community's members for generations into
104. Supra note 59.
105. R. v. Gladue, [1999] 1 S.C.R. 688 at para. 65: "The unbalanced ratio of imprisonment
for aboriginal offenders flows from a number of sources, including poverty, substance abuse,
lack of education, and the lack of employment opportunities foT aboriginal people. It arises also
from a bias against aboriginal people and from an unfortunate institutional approach that is
more inclined to refuse bail and to impose more and longer prison terms for aboriginal
offenders." In this case, the Court made some very significant statements about the reasons why
there are so many Aboriginals in federal and provincial jails which relates to the general state
of affairs for Aboriginal people in their daily dealings with government and society as a whole.
106. Keepness, supra note 28 at para. 41.
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the future. Even the first Indian Act in 1868 had a more inclusive criteria
for determining "Indian" status. Section 15 of that Act stated in part:
Firstly. All persons of Indian Blood, reputed to belong to the particular
tribe, band or body of Indians interested in such lands or immoveable
property, and their descendants;
Secondly. All persons residing among such Indians, whose parents were or
are, or either of them was or is, descended on either side from Indians or
an Indian reputed to belong to the particular tribe, band or body of Indians
interested in such lands or immoveable property, and the descendants of
all such persons.... 107
A position which based disqualification for treaty rights on the present
day Indian Act would lead to the eventual disappearance of all treaty
beneficiaries. This position advocates a "disappearing treaty right" which
would allow the Crown to do indirectly what it cannot do directly;
namely, deny the exercise of these treaty rights. This was not what was
intended by the Mi'kmaq when they agreed to this treaty. Nor is this what
was intended by the original Indian Act which legislated descendancy as
the key to status. The court in Marshall warned against such limiting
interpretations:
The findings of fact made by the trial judge taken as a whole demonstrate
that the concept of a disappearing treaty right does justice neither to the
honour of the Crown nor to the reasonable expectations of the Mi'kmaq
people. It is their common intention in 1760... to which effect must be
given."'
The common intention in 1760 was that the Mi'kmaq and their heirs and
descendants forever would have the benefit of the treaty protected
Aboriginal rights to pursue their traditional fishing activities and sell their
products to support themselves and their families. The Mi'kmaq agreed
to the treaty as a measure of safeguarding their trading rights for all future
generations to come. The treaty was neither for the purpose of putting to
paper who was a Mi'kmaq in 1760, nor who they would be in 1999. To
interpret the treaty in such a restrictive manner ensures that the treaty
rights eventually disappear, not directly, but indirectly by virtue of the
diminishing class of beneficiaries.
The trade arrangement must be interpreted in a manner which gives
meaning and substance to the promises made by the Crown. In my view,
with respect, the interpretation adopted by the courts below left the
Mi'kmaq with an empty shell of a treaty promise.10 9
107. Indian Act, S.C. 1868, c.42, s.15.
108. Marshall, supra note 1 at para. 40 [emphasis added].
109. Ibid. at para. 52 [emphasis added].
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The only position which could possibly give meaning to the treaty is one
which recognizes the right to sell fish by all Mi'kmaq peoples regardless
of the Indian Act. Given the direction provided by the Supreme Court of
Canada with respect to beneficiaries, and given the progress that has been
made between the Crown and Aboriginal peoples through such success-
ful negotiations as the Yukon Agreement, "o there remains a strong case
to be made not only for the inclusion of non-status Indians into their
communities, but also for a way to work out the management of these
rights through negotiated agreements that could be based on the current
AFS agreements between DFO and the Aboriginal groups or something
totally new. These AFS agreements have not been without their problems
as indicated in the following historical overview of these agreements.
2. Communication Gaps Do Not Seem to Have Narrowed
After Sparrow, DFO negotiated agreements with the Aboriginal groups
in Nova Scotia, New Brunswick and other provinces with regard to the
Aboriginal food fishery which included the non-status Indians. These
agreements were part of the overall Aboriginal Fisheries Strategy and
were intended to address the exercise of the right to fish for food, social
and ceremonial purposes in a limited fashion. The purpose of the
limitation was to ensure that conservation of the fish stocks would be
properly addressed. DFO has a number of these AFS agreements with
both the First Nations and the provincial Aboriginal organizations that
represent the off-reserve Aboriginal people which consist of both status
and non-status people. The Native Council of Nova Scotia (NCNS) and
the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council (NBAPC), for example,
each hold food fishery agreements with DFO. While DFO did include a
statement in these agreements that they cannot be used as evidence of
Aboriginal or treaty rights, another section did state that the agreements
have resulted from discussions based on "current legislation, jurispru-
dence and government policy .... -iI The two main groups that DFO
negotiated with in the Atlantic region were the Councils of many of the
individual bands and the off-reserve Aboriginal organizations. The AFS
agreements that are signed with these off-reserve organizations are
similar to some of the agreements signed with the First Nations. These
agreements limit the amount of fish that may be taken under the food
fishery by the particular Aboriginal group. In exchange for the limits on
110. Supranote20.
111. Fisheries Agreement Between Her Majesty the Queen as represented by the Minister of
Fisheries and Oceans and the New Brunswick Aboriginal Peoples Council (13 June 1997) s.
1(4) [hereinafter Fisheries Agreement].
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the food fish that can be taken, the Aboriginal group may receive funding
to train Aboriginal people to be fisheries guardians, funding to acquire
fishing boats and related equipment, and funding to staff a fisheries
coordinator and/or other staff to run their fisheries program. While
commercial allocations of certain fish stocks were also included, the
groups felt that they did not go far enough to match the rights protected
under the Treaties of 1760-61. It has been this commercial aspect of the
AFS agreements that seems to have generated the most controversy in
British Columbia after Sparrow, and in the Maritimes after Marshall.
The authors of a background paper entitled The Aboriginal Fisheries
and the Sparrow Decision"2 reviewed the AFS agreements roughly a
year or so after the first AFS agreements had been in place. The
background paper noted DFO's characterization of the AFS agreements
as the federal government's response to the need to expand Aboriginal
peoples' role in the fisheries while at the same time conserving fish stocks
in order to have a "profitable" fisheries for all parties. 3 In 1993, they had
this to say about the manner in which DFO handled the issue of
commerciality:
This obvious lack of past and present transparency will likely be detrimen-
tal to the smooth operation of the AFS; as well, the confusion created by
senior officials' statements.., has only exacerbated feelings of insecurity
among the parties concerned. This absence of transparency has also led
some individuals to overstep the rules, which has added a little more
pressure and confusion to a situation that was chaotic from the outset."
4
The above quotation serves as an ominous prediction, given the news
broadcast on ASN on Sunday, October 3, 1999 which reported that over
a hundred non-Aboriginal fisherman with knives went to the docks in one
New Brunswick community and allegedly destroyed many Aboriginal
lobster traps. The non-Aboriginal fishermen have criticized DFO's
method of incorporating Aboriginal rights and for not better informing
the public, among other things. The authors of the background paper
noted this problem six years ago:
[T]he communication gaps do not seemed to have narrowed. As we have
noted, the apparent lack of communication is a lack of listening more than
anything else, by DFO as well as by non-aboriginal commercial fishing
groups; this is a problem that only intensifies with time, and one that DFO
has not yet been able to solve."'
112. J. Allain & J. D. Frdchette, Aboriginal Fisheries and the Sparrow Decision, Background
Paper (Ottawa: Library of Parliament, 1993).
113. Ibid.
114. Ibid. at l8.
115. Ibid. at 25.
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Assuming for a moment that AFS agreements will soon be negotiated
with all the Mi'kmaq groups for the purposes of managing the treaty
rights with valid conservation measures, the issue of beneficiaries will
have to be addressed. This process will be a difficult one but in light of
the fact that the Treaties of 1760-61 apply to all Mi'kmaq people
including non-status Mi'kmaq, some process will have to be worked out
to accommodate this reality.
There are AFS agreements currently in place with both the Aboriginal
organizations that represent non-status Indians in New Brunswick and
Nova Scotia. The agreements for these groups and many other First
Nation groups have been in place for several years. There are specific
sections in the AFS agreements that deal with the beneficiary issue, that
is "who," in these organizations are entitled to fish. These provisions
serve as an example of possible interim measures for controlling the
conservation aspect of the fishery through identification. Section 5(2) of
the NBAPC AFS agreement for example, provided:
5. (2) Subject to this subsection, all members of the Aboriginal Organiza-
tion who have a membership card are designated to fish.
7. (1) The Aboriginal Organization will designate persons to fish by
issuing designation cards. Each card will be personal and non-transferable
and will bear a unique card number and the name of the person desig-
nated." 6
In regard to the Aboriginal food fishery (as opposed to a commercial
fishery), all members of the NBAPC were entitled to exercise these
rights. 17 Membership in these kinds of Aboriginal organizations have
changed over the years and some now base membership on the ability of
the applicant to demonstrate their ancestral link to an Aboriginal person.
Many organizations across Canada have instituted cut-off dates which
put a limit on how far back one can trace ancestry to qualify for
membership. While some of these organizations also represent Aborigi-
nal peoples from outside Mi'kmaq and Maliseet territory, they may also
116. Fisheries Agreement, supra note 11l at 12-13 [emphasis added].
117. Ibid. Section 9(1) provides: "This Agreement will take effect on execution by both
Parties and, subject to subsections (2) to (8), will continue in effect until March 31, 1998 or until
this Agreement is replaced by a treaty or land claim agreement, whichever is the earlier." These
AFS agreements deal with the issuance of tags for limited species as well as a method of
recording catches to ensure that proper numbers can be used in those calculations. They make
provision for the training and funding of Aboriginal Fisheries Guardians whose stated mandate
it is to monitor the fishery. These duties would include recording catches, monitoring habitat
activities and enforcement. The agreement also provided a section that dealt with economic
development for the Aboriginal Organization, co-operative management of the fishery and
funding to support these activities. Other issues such as ongoing consultation, ratification of
the agreement and its term were also included.
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have different policies with respect to their ability, if any, to hunt and fish
in New Brunswick and Nova Scotia. The purpose of this example is
merely to show that this issue is not a new one and DFO has attempted to
deal with it prior to Marshall. There are ways to deal with the identifica-
tion of treaty beneficiaries aside from simply cutting out a large group of
Mi'kmaq people. The need to begin open, good faith discussions cannot
be overstated. In addition to all the recent enforcement cases involving
Aboriginal peoples,118 CAP's new claim may help bring the non-status
issue to the forefront, or its opponents may come up with a different claim.
Either way, these issues will not go away any time soon. The opportunity
to resolve the issue peacefully, with give and take on all sides, will only
last for so long. The courts decided Marshall for us and government and
society seemed wholly unprepared. Must we also use the courts to settle
the very identity and worth of our country's First Peoples? Is this a gamble
worth making for Canadians or for Aboriginal peoples?
118. Often the media have reported that the Aboriginal groups have complained of the
treatment they receive from enforcement officials during and after treaty test cases. Certainly
the courts have commented that the Crown cannot keep treating Aboriginal people in the same
manner as they have been for the last several centuries. In Keepness, supra, note 28 an accused
was pursued on his own reserve by undercover officers under a unit called "WASP" for the
alleged sale of deer meat. Not only was the accused found not guilty, the court made some
comments about the disturbing actions of the Crown's agents. Judge Linton Smith stated at
paras. 64-67: "I have already noted my concerns about the manner in which agents of the
province conducted their investigation in this case. In preparing this decision, I have become
aware of otherjudgments which have also commented negatively on the conduct of provincial
wildlife officers concerning the way they dealt with Aboriginal people. In the recent decision
of my colleague, Judge Moxley in R. v. Ironeagle and Cyr, [November 8, C.E. 1999] the learned
judge ordered a judicial stay based on the improper entrapment of the accused by the
investigating wildlife officers. In R. v. Sasakamoose... my colleague, Judge Carter noted that
alcohol had been employed by a provincial conservation officer in the course of an investiga-
tion of illegal sale of fish .... [A]nyone familiar with Aboriginal people will know that right
thinking members of that community, especially the elders, will be appalled to learn that Her
Majesty's agents would have taken alcohol onto a reserve or employed its use in their
investigation of Aboriginal people .... If these three cases are indicative of the approach that
Saskatchewan wildlife officers are taking to enforcing the law in Aboriginal communities, they
will soon lose their credibility with Aboriginal people. It may well be time for senior officials
of the provincial government to analyse the ways in which Aboriginal people are being
investigated by their officials so they can make the necessary reforms." [emphasis added]
If the Wildlife enforcement officers of Saskatchewan are any indication of how the Crown
treats Aboriginal people in the Maritime region with regards to their traditional fisheries or
wildlife activities, some serious changes are urgently needed. The attitude toward Canada's
Aboriginal peoples manifest itself in both overt actions and policies as well as more subtle acts
such as was noted by the judge in Keepness. The very name of the Crown's enforcement group
in Saskatchewan was highly offensive. Judge Smith comments at n. II say it all with regard
to the need for change in Canada's attitude "I cannot imagine a more insensitive choice of
names ("WASP" universally stands for "White Anglo-Saxon Protestant"). In this case, the
police actions in question took place on an Indian reserve and the person being investigated was
Aboriginal. All of the personnel participating in the police action were white males. I do not
know whether this name was chosen out of insensitivity or racism. Either way, it shows an
approach to enforcing the law which needs reform."
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Conclusion
"Aboriginal identity lies at the heart of Aboriginal peoples' existence."' 19
The Royal Commission could not have summed up what this issue means
to non-status Indians any better than this. In this article I have reviewed
the Marshall case as it pertains to the issue of treaty beneficiaries and the
further clarifications provided by the Court in Marshall. Neither decision
specifically excluded non-status Indians, rather they referred to the treaty
rights of the Mi'kmaq people and their individual families and their
communities. It cannot be said that non-status Mi'kmaq persons are
prohibited from partaking in treaty activities because they are not
registered under the Indian Act and therefore not band members and
therefore cannot live on the reserve and therefore are not members of their
community. This would mean that an arbitrary law enacted decades after
the treaty was signed, could now say who has treaty rights, without
specifically stating as much in the Act.
I can offer little in the way of concrete provisions for future AFS
agreements at this early stage other than suggestions for beginning a
dialogue between the parties as soon as possible. Issues such as this one
regarding the rights of non-status Indians, if left to the media and secrecy,
can only lead to further political turmoil, more costly litigation, further
division within the Aboriginal community and a total breakdown of
communication. The people who would suffer the most in that scenario
would be the Aboriginal peoples. We should all work in the spirit of
partnership and see this issue as an opportunity to benefit from the
management skills of both the Mi'kmaq tradition and the current science
of DFO conservation measures. A successful partnership on this front
could lead to peaceful resolutions of other resource issues relating to
hunting, fowling and gathering. No one will know whether negotiations
could have been successful unless they try and no one can lose by
increasing communication. This could be a new beginning for Crown-
Mi'kmaq relations if we can just be creative enough to exchange new
ideas on how to work together and be open enough to consider them. The
next steps are the most important ones and may well set the tone for
Aboriginal-Crown relations for the next five hundred years. Certainly the
CAP litigation means that the issue of federal responsibility for all
Aboriginal people, including non-status Indians, must be addressed
immediately. Is there any reason why Canada and Aboriginal people
cannot resolve the issue in the spirit of our treaty making ancestors? There
is no other alternative if our First Peoples are to continue to grow and
119. RCAP, vol.4, supra note 83 at 521.
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evolve within their own cultures. No less would be acceptable for other
Canadians and their own particular identities. This incredible power over
Aboriginal people must be exercised with caution. We no longer need
diseases, wars or scalping bounties to wipe out a people. Today, silent
acquiescence by society towards the current legislation and policy
towards non-status Indians is all that is necessary to bring about the
extinction of these Aboriginal people. The non-status Aboriginal Peoples
of this continent deserve to exist and retain their dignity, pride and
connection to their ancestors as part of their cultural evolution.
